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Introduction: Partnership or Organization?  
 
      Some influential propositions for the revival of labour institutions in Britain have 
attracted a lot of attention. One focuses on the relationship of trade unionists with 
managers and attempts to bring forth an innovative style of reciprocal action founded 
upon the concept of social partnership, with its implication for further collaboration 
(Tailby and Winchester, 2000). Supporters of this proposal acknowledge that unionists 
are subordinate and intermediate actors and suggest that they must develop the 
resourcefulness of managers so as to increase their own institutional influence and also 
create more chances to enlist new associates. Another proposition focuses on the 
regenerated interest in recruiting and coordinating union members and is defined by the 
effort to revitalize the labour movement on the principle of membership increase and the 
reinforcement of collective organization. From this perspective, institutions should 
develop their intrinsic resourcefulness which is based around the presumption that 
employees’ willingness to provide for their own institutions is the underlying principle 
for long term revival. 
      The terminology and diverse interpretations of social partnership and collective 
organization are quite dissimilar and are usually described by scholars as genuine 
alternatives for the revival of British trade unions (Kelly, 1996). Nevertheless, what is 
evident, is that ingredients of both are sometimes combined in union strategy. The TUC, 
for instance, has made an effort to bring out a culture of organizing all over the labour 
institutions and founded an Organizing Academy to educate a breed of trade unionists in 
the methods of the organizing model. Simultaneously, it has supported social partnership 
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as regards the relationship with managers, founded a Partnership Institute and 
recommended a number of regulations, that can support the formation of partnership 
arrangements. The chapter continues by studying the degree to which social partnership 
and collective organization are real substitutes, whether they can emerge complementary, 
and even strengthening components within a composite policy for trade unions revival. 
      The techniques that institutions may employ to serve their interests are diverse and 
may be defined in a number of ways. Institutions may depend on various rules and 
regulations, may be of an antagonistic or a collaborative nature as concerns their relations 
with managers and may select either the application of the organizing model and renewed 
membership growth or to service their participants through a network of agents. 
Partnership arrangements evidently attempt to develop joint interests with managers and 
establish the concept of a productivity coalition, in which protection, growth and 
participation theoretically are traded for employees’ devotion and versatility. In several 
occasions, this is described as a mutual expression of common interests and dedication to 
cooperation (Knell, 1999). Partnership arrangements ordinarily attempt to minimize 
centralized organizational structures and usually incorporate long term settlements, 
depend on practices that discard the necessity of regular negotiation or decrease the 
institutional participation in the wage setting procedure (Allen and Haynes, 1999). The 
main objective is to deemphasize the importance of controversy between managers and 
employees, for practical purposes by making decisions about the issues of workplace 
relations where industrial disputes are reasonably expected. 
      The policy of social partnership attempts to improve union relations with managers. 
Nevertheless, it might be an effort to reform union relations with employees. From a 
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different point of view, social partnership is based on the subservience of trade unionists 
and the diminishing part of labour institutions in promoting the interests of employees 
(Blyton and Turnbull, 1998). In support of this view is the important part of professional 
officers in the designation and implementation of partnership arrangements, in a number 
of occasions such as Asda, CSL, Hyder, Tesco as well as the Scottish liquors sector. 
There is proof that social partnership leads to a decrease in the amount and scope of 
responsibilities of shop stewards (Kelly, 1999). 
      The part of managers in the formation of institutional activity has been the centre of 
investigation in industrial relations, and there has been an original interest about the 
significance of management qualities in determining the selection of many institutional 
policies (Kelly, 1998). This, subsequently, has initiated a debate about the determinants 
of management values. Scholars have described the significance of production, the part of 
pressure groups and the conveyance of decision making from trade unions to managers in 
a number of different manners (Healy and Kirton, 1999). 
      In many occasions, social partnership has surfaced from a financial emergency, as a 
consequence of government propositions to cut down employment expenses to increase 
competitiveness. This is a characteristic feature of social partnership at Barclays, Blue 
Circle, the Cooperative bank, Hyder, National Westminster and Rover (IRS, 1997). This 
indicates that an explanation of social partnership as a reaction to a  favourable long term 
economic and social transformation may not be accurate. Social partnership may be the 
outcome of short term economic transformation and financial emergency and, to the 
extent that it incorporates incremental adjustments, it may be the adaptation of 
institutions to negotiations and practices in the context of organizational change. There is 
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some proof for this argument in the number of partnership agreements that was the 
outcome of manager coercion of institutions. This was manifested in the threat of 
dismantlement of labour institutions, the possibility of dismantlement unless partnerships 
were agreed, or the possibility of closure and increased unemployment. There is limited 
evidence of employer-dominant partnership agreements that had a negative effect on 
trade unions. Some arrangements include terms which restrict the capacity of trade 
unions to bargain by supporting the procedure of joint consultation or joint problem 
solving e.g. at Blue Circle, Hyder, Scottish Widows, Thames Water and United Distillers 
(IRS, 2000). There is also proof that the influence of trade unions has been diminished by 
these arrangements. In several firms the tasks and responsibilities of employee delegates 
and trade unionists have become restricted e.g. at Allied Domecq, ASDA, Blue Circle, 
Hyder and United Distillers (IRS, 1998). In many occasions, nevertheless, partnership 
agreements are defined as labour-dominant such as the case studies of Legal and General 
and Tesco that will be discussed in one of the following sections. Partnerships are 
recommended as a policy for institutional revitalization, but some times partnerships have 
also emerged from a threat to the status of institutions and in several cases may stand for 
institutional incorporation to a manager dominant procedure of reformation. 
      In spite of the support by the Trade Unions Congress and other institutions, 
partnership arrangements continue to be somewhat restricted in the industrial relations of 
the United Kingdom (Guest, 2001; Heery, 2002). There have been several partnerships in 
distinct branches of the economy, like banks and retailers but, in other sectors, 
partnership agreements have not been very successful, for example business services, 
cement and water. What is more, one of the most well known partnership agreements at 
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Hyder has virtually disintegrated after the buying out of the firm, and the threat of 
liquidation for Rover and Vauxhall’s Luton industrial plants have hindered partnerships 
in the car sector. Because of these constraints, are there any other obstacles to the broader 
diffusion of partnerships in the United Kingdom? 
      Although executives are in favour of the concept of collaboration, this may not result 
in the recognition of partnerships between unionists and managers advocated by the 
Trade Unions Congress. A recent study conducted by the associates of the Involvement 
and Participation Association indicates that executives are favourably disposed towards 
the aim of social partnership but consider this as not important for the part of labour 
institutions (IPA, 1997). Partnerships for managers, it appears, can function in a union 
free industry and take the shape of the participation of independent workers (Knell, 
1999). In the United States HRM focuses upon the relations of independent workers, and 
may be considered by executives as another option to the advantages of versatility and 
devotion, which are thought as characteristic features of arranged partnerships between 
unionists and managers. 
      With reference to the institutional policy of collective organization, what is clear, at 
all events in the propositions of its supporters, is that it must be comprehensive. As a 
consequence in establishing the Academy, the Trade Unions Congress stated that its goal 
was not only to enlarge membership but to support trade unionists to attract employees at 
the rough end of the market who are in need of help from institutions. There was an urge 
to combine collective organization with other strategies, so as the apprenticeship of 
females, junior employees, foreign labour, and employees on temporary agreements 
could be prioritized. Arguably, industrial policies have been fused and the enlistment of 
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trade unionists is targeted at companies protected by recognized arrangements and at 
employees with a strong participation in labour institutions. However, among unionists 
taking part in the Academy, there is proof of a new approach of enlargement in the effort 
to utilize Academy Organizers to attract non unionists. There is more proof that unionists 
attempt to increase recruitment in associations of employees on contingent contracts who 
have been disregarded in previous years, and a number of activities by Academy 
Organizers have been targeted at female employees (Heery et al. 2000). 
      Demonstrating the argument of conflicting interests, the prevailing attitude of the 
manager about organized unionists is competitive. The issue of partnerships has not been 
defined clearly by the Organizing Academy and apprenticeships have emphasized the 
necessity to specify levers, which may be utilized to pressurize managers in recognizing 
labour institutions. In ongoing campaigns, nevertheless, trade unionists are realistic and, 
especially when concessions are involved may pursue the full collaboration of employers 
in providing opportunities for employees and removing obstacles to partnership 
agreements (Heery et al. 2002). As social partnership entails no framework of relations 
with unionists, so collective organization entails no framework of activities by managers. 
      In America, the advocacy of the organizing model materialized by means of a 
management transformation and the appointment of the 1968 generation in influential 
posts of labour institutions (Heery et al. 2001). In the United Kingdom, the less radical 
organizational change has originated from a comparable but less militant, revival of 
institutional management. Therefore, the establishment of the Organizing Academy by 
the Trade Unions Congress has stemmed from the official institutionalization of the 
academy, by John Monks when he was General Secretary in the late nineties. As a 
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consequence of this, the Trade Unions Congress founded a new Campaigns and 
Communications Department, and the urge for the advocacy of collective organization 
originated from employees who joined the department. In some of the most determined 
labour institutions, there has been a fundamental transformation, with new unionists 
developing new industrial strategies. What is more, the Organizing Academy, includes a 
policy of revival by means of a selective process in an effort to educate a nationwide 
contingent of youngsters and women and develop collective organization (Heery, 2002). 
      Industrial policies have incorporated organizational expansion and stem from the 
American Federation of Labours’ Organizing Institute and the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions Organizing Works Programme. A number of trade unionists have linked to 
labour institutions in those countries and organized exchanges of employees so as to 
promote institutional expansion and gain experience. This has resulted in the acceptance 
of the ideas, strategies and vocabulary which sustain the USA organizing model, whereas 
effective collective organization elsewhere has also influenced incremental adjustment in 
the United Kingdom. 
      In spite of the Organizing Academy and other labour institutions, collective 
organization continues to be somewhat restricted in the UK. The range of assets allocated 
by labour institutions to collective organization is limited, several institutions recruit only 
a few trade unionists if any at all and the most vigorous efforts to bring forth a new form 
of interaction have been constrained. Membership decrease was an important issue in 
many developed industrialized societies in the nineties. This decrease was evident in the 
United Kingdom. According to the British Household Panel Survey, unionization 
decreased from 9,947,000 to 7,807,000 trade union members in the nineties (BHPS, 
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1999).  The Labour Force Survey indicates that aggregate density as a percentage of the 
workforce decreased from 38.1 percent to 30.2 percent during the nineties (LFS, 1999). 
As opposed to the USA, where membership decrease in the privatized companies 
surpassed membership decrease in the nationalized firms, in the United Kingdom density 
declined equally. Since the turn of the century, the number of union members has become 
stable at thirty percent of total employment, but regardless of the recognition law, there 
seems to be no indication of a large increase (Charlwood, 2003). This indicates that there 
are obstacles to the spread of the organizing culture and the revitalization of labour 
institutions through efforts to develop intrinsic resourcefulness by recruiting unionists 
and by the means of militant organizing movements. An essential supporting structure for 
describing these obstacles has been defined by scholars, who suggest that many 
provisions are demanded for employees to mobilize them in the organizing model (Kelly, 
1998). These contain a feeling of rejection and unfairness, indication of oppression and 
wrongfulness by the manager, the existence of an organizing approach in order to 
mobilize employees, assurance that the organizing model is successful and culminates in 
the fighting of unrighteousness, and the involvement of unionists who can become active 
and sustain the organizing approach when confronted by manager resistance. 
      Things are rather promising, and it would be a mistake to exaggerate the level of 
employment dissatisfaction in Britain. The worker behaviour findings of the 2004 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey indicated that most employees in the UK feel 
secure, satisfied with their job and committed to their task, but only a few of them also 
think that they are fairly treated by employers (Blanchflower et al. 2006). Besides that, 
fair treatment, is more probable to be mentioned by non unionists. There is large diversity 
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in the workplace, and the evidence suggests a high possibility for the mobilization of 
trade unionists. The low level of employment dissatisfaction among several non 
unionists, nevertheless, may be considered as a restriction on the ability of labour 
institutions to organize employees in militant movements. 
      This section has introduced a critical evaluation of a couple of different propositions 
for the potential resurgence of labour institutions in the United Kingdom, social 
partnership and collective organization. These propositions rely upon distinct options 
with reference to institutional representation, the clarification of employee benefits and 
institutional practices, as well as the interdependence of managers and workers. They are 
distinct as regards the explanation of the development of the capitalist system, on the one 
hand defining a number of joint interests for workers and managers and on the other the 
opposite. It is amazing, nevertheless, that these institutional policies have not been 
encouraged by some labour institutions up to now. However, they have been supported 
by the Trade Unions Congress, whereas other labour institutions for example Britain’s 
General Union, Manufacturing Science and Finance Union, Public and Commercial 
Services Union, The Public Service Union, Union of Shop Distributive and Allied 
Workers have also made their own arrangements and in several occasions subsidized 
apprenticeships at the Organizing Academy. Taking into account this fusion of policies, 
the objective of this chapter is to determine if social partnership and collective 
organization are complementary in an integrated policy for institutional revitalization. 
      In my study of the workplace model of Germany, I have given an account of the 
expansion of labour institutions by way of fighting for partnership. Institutional 
expansion and campaigning, I demonstrated, was the prerequisite for initiating the mixed 
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strategy of sector agreements and coordination with the aid of WCs, which has sustained 
a correspondingly successful stakeholder economy in Germany. If social partnership and 
collective organization are synthesized in the United Kingdom, it has to be in a 
comparable manner, as a consequence of the revival of trade unionism, and industrial 
arrangements in order to restrict managers as regards authority and respond to the 
requirements of workers. 
 
Business Ethics and Stake Holding 
 
      It was twenty years ago that Ken Gill emphasized the importance of strong 
institutions for a stakeholder society. In the meantime, membership density has decreased 
from almost fifty percent to about thirty five percent of the employees, as a consequence 
of high unemployment, unfavourable statutory provisions and management resistance 
(Ackers and Smith, 1996). Consequently, during the eighties and the nineties the 
influence of trade unionism was diminished, as large companies conformed to 
fundamentalist policies in a plan to devise an industrial relations system in the United 
Kingdom without strong institutions. It was ten years ago, that an innovative idea in 
human resource management, started to open opportunities for institutions, leading both 
employers and employees to a workplace relations system distinct from the one promised 
in the eighties. At the beginning of the twenty first century, social partnership emerged as 
another option in employment relations, and a succession to the Thatcherite strategy to 
enfeeble and disregard labour institutions. The term appears in addition to other concepts, 
like business ethics and stake holding and is supported by the European Union, the Trade 
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Unions Congress, New Labour, the Involvement and Participation Association and 
leading managers. The Confederation of British Industry uses the same rhetoric, although 
in a careful manner (CBI, 1999). 
      So far, stake holding had only a vague and ill defined role, in European Works 
Councils and sporadic efforts at a joint process between management and labour 
institutions (Ackers and Black, 1994). This section is more relevant to the reformed 
consciousness emerging in industrial relations than to the advantages of those occasional 
premature and, until now, unsubstantial efforts. I want to demonstrate that stake holding, 
in spite of its ill defined character, is a good chance for labour institutions to come back 
from socioeconomic exclusion. For this purpose I present a radical interpretation of stake 
holding and worker participation, so as to differentiate these notions from the human 
resource management policies of the eighties and nineties, and examine how they help 
labour institutions in their attempt to reclaim part of the lost ground in the workplace. 
Firstly, I introduce a matrix of concepts, derived from the debate on the part of 
institutions in employment relations, as a foundation for analyzing the ambiguous and 
vague rhetoric advocated by political, economic and social groups. Secondly, I question 
those general statements, by arranging in detail semantic threads of stake holding and 
clarifying some more conceptual tools. Lastly, I propose an outline of stake holding, 
based on the theories of Antonio Gramsci, which opens opportunities for institutions to 
obtain a central role in workplace relations. From this point of view social partnership as 
a strategy may be quite influential in the political and economic developments. This part 
focuses on the impact of stake holding upon the characteristics of institutions with 
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reference to the relations between employers and employees, and helps us to understand 
the latest management fads. 
      The primary, and most fundamental, notion is Alan Fox’s frames of reference, which 
reflect upon the behaviour of employers and employees and the part of labour 
institutions. From one perspective, stake holding can guarantee an improved variant of 
pluralism which sustained the authority of institutions. From a different point of view, it 
can be interpreted in terms of employee involvement as one more unitarist stratagem to 
compromise the self determination of British labour institutions. Although stake holding 
appears to be established in pluralism it is also in agreement with the feeling of 
discontent for industrial dispute (Provis, 1996). Subsequently, we have to comprehend 
what kind of pluralism British institutions can look forward to. Without doubt, social 
partnership signifies concepts or ideas of mutual concession and of employee 
participation. As a result, current discussion on stake holding focuses on the issues of 
business ethics in employment relations, and associates with three different, but not 
completely separate, definitions of these patterns, minimal pluralist voluntarism, 
industrial democracy and neo-corporatism (Ackers and Payne, 1998). 
      These pluralist notions of stake holding have a bearing on the formation of 
institutional policy and the preferred course of action. The restoration of bargaining and 
consultation is contingent on the success of obtaining employee backing and manager 
assistance. During the time that the Tories were in government and the European Union 
was distant, labour institutions had no alternative but to focus on the shopfloor. 
Nevertheless, the likelihood of increased European Union integration, advocated by the 
Socialists, gives rise to the expectation of statutory provisions, coming on the scene, as a 
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new saviour, to redeem the weakened labour institutions. Since the mid-nineties, the 
concept of stake holding as a strong form of worker participation or a new form of 
economic management has augmented its reputation with European Works Councils. As 
a consequence, we can anticipate the language of members of parliament, unionists and 
entrepreneurs to illustrate new possibilities as well as recent developments. Nevertheless, 
if stake holding is founded upon a disintegrated system of industrial relations between 
managers and works councillors or unionists, the threat to long-term institutional 
authority and sovereignty is evident. In spite of the fact that the academic literature of 
workplace relations describes a number of courses of action, stake holding may be 
perceived as an option between pluralism and unitarism. 
      This analysis helps us to clarify the ambiguous and vague meaning of social 
partnership and to question some statements. To what an extent is stake holding 
voluntarist or neo-corporatist? How the restoration of bargaining and consultation can be 
achieved, as an all inclusive variant of sector agreements, strong forms of worker 
participation, or creation of new forms of economic management? To what a degree 
social partnership is contingent on a pluralist or unitarist structure? Furthermore, what 
should be the new equilibrium of collectivism and individualism, in industrial relations as 
regards employment rights at national and European Union levels? This account 
associates with the formation of institutional policy about management funding, 
employee benefits and government subsidies. 
      The former Public Service Union General Secretary, Roger Poole, provided a 
comparable explanation of stake holding and business ethics. The most important issue 
for labour institutions is the restoration of bargaining and consultation within the context 
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of collaboration with employers and statutory provisions for employees (UNISON, 
1998). Britain’s former General Union leader, John Edmonds, has reflected on social 
partnership in industrial relations and on the roles of managers and workers. When 
employers overstate human resource management, employees must play down this 
verbosity as a means of building up the influence of labour institutions (GMB, 1998). In 
this manner, stake holding may well be functional, as a plan to devise a different 
relationship between managers and workers. Labour institutions take a chance in 
supporting employee involvement schemes and social partnership. A strategy like this 
may be the driving force for a unitarist ploy, to enfeeble trade unions, and also decrease 
the authority of British labour institutions. It is also the responsibility of institutions to 
persuade employees that union-management collaboration and employee involvement are 
of no use for trade unions without collective organization. To this end, they have to 
imbue themselves with new life and attempt to secure the support of employees and other 
actors. Scholars speculate that this is a risky undertaking. 
Traditionally, we have insisted that trade unions must be the sole channel for working people. 
The German works council system breaches that principle. All employees, whether trade union 
members or not, have the right to elect their representatives, and even the elected representatives 
do not have to be in a union. So the British unions are gambling that we can match the German 
performance and capture most of the works council seats. If we succeed works councils would 
become our dream solution to the problem of declining trade union power. But, if we fail, we 
join the French trade unionists in a nightmare scenario where non-union representatives 
dominate the local committees and unions are marginalized. We have made the policy change 
with our eyes open but success is certainly not guaranteed. (Taylor, 1994) 
      Although the Involvement and Participation Association favours neither a collectivist 
nor an individualist attitude in the workplace, it focuses more on organizing rather than 
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partnership and favours the wide ranging employee privileges visualized by the European 
Union (IPA, 1997). The Confederation of British Industry, with such a heterogeneous 
workforce, is rather cautious. Its General Secretary, Adair Turner, acknowledged, that 
what has to be created is a basic system providing workers with a good chance to become 
involved in industrial relations (CBI, 1999). The Confederation of British Industry has 
taken a stand against constitutional enactments such as the Social Chapter and the 
European Works Councils rules and regulations, for the reason that its associates fear that 
works councils are mechanisms to restore trade union power. All the same, in comparison 
with the Institute of Directors, they minimize the importance of the ongoing 
developments, and emphasize their capacity for incremental adjustment. Divisions within 
the Confederation of British Industry became apparent in the discussions about the 
European Union, where supporters of the Involvement and Participation Association’s 
views disputed the Institute of Director’s positions. Scholars portrayed a shift in the 
modus operandi of industrial relations. 
Hammondism is not enough, because it still takes collective bargaining as the model for pay 
determination. If collective bargaining fades away like yesterday’s product line, as it is already 
starting to do, then trade unions will have to rethink their role and purpose even more radically 
than the EETPU and the AEU have already done. In truth, this radically unitarist, individualist 
and voluntarist agenda leaves little place for unions as we know them. (Ackers and Payne, 1998) 
      Other commentators have indicated that employee involvement, during the last 
twenty years, has traded the unitarist ideology and the doctrine of mutual concession for 
an effective framework of collectivist principles and standards (Provis, 1996). The 
vocabulary of stake holding used by the Trade Unions Congress gives a reply to the 
ethical turn of enterprises, by, immediately, identifying employers’ pretence and 
The Evolution of Trade Unions in Britain 17 
describing team working in a way that emphasizes concepts like equity and legitimacy. 
The theoretical and practical understanding is that public values are springs of action 
which not only may motivate people, but also serve to persuade others. Trade unionists 
need to realize that a new emphasis on values also requires a new conception of the 
process by which differences can be reconciled. What is the meaning of this course of 
action for labour institutions? For about ten years, the debate on industrial relations has 
omitted or neglected labour institutions. In a state of everlasting conflict between 
managers and workers any talk of a stake holder society was dismissed to a less 
important position. In my opinion, stake holding offers a new realism which, may be 
vague and ill defined, but is not without substance as the objections of the neo liberals 
suggest. Such an incorporation of unionists and councillors in a stake holder economy 
opens opportunities for a new approach to relationships at work, security of employment 
and job flexibility, sharing in the success of the organization, information, consultation 
and employee involvement, representation of the workforce, and an alternative for labour 
institutions to restore their organizational power in the workplace. 
      The works of Marxian authors set forward a different approach of comprehending the 
ongoing developments in Britain (Butler et al. 2000; Gramsci, 2000, Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001). We can point out the difference of a war of manoeuvre or militant strategy and a 
war of position or mutual concession. A modern approach that is suitable for a western 
liberal economy, is one defined more by a voluntarist attitude than an authoritarian 
behaviour. To make progress, labour institutions have to go beyond the range of working 
towards financial benefits, and develop their own hegemony associated with a plan which 
provides for the demands of the working class in opposition to the supremacy of the 
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bourgeoisie. Furthermore, a plan like this should not be restricted to unrealistic language 
or vocabulary, but has to be incorporated in organizational operations. As indicated, 
because of fundamentalist policies, institutions found themselves in a hostile 
environment. We can also apply this assessment to the evolution of labour institutions in 
Britain. Like in the past, but on a much more favourable terrain, their potential is in 
question. A coalition of parties, governments and groups, such as the Institute of 
Directors, has cast doubt on the endurance of institutions, greatly enfeebled and 
disregarded them by means of coercion, statutory provisions, restrictions and 
concessions. The policies have embodied human resource management and employee 
involvement to win public support. Occasionally they marginalize labour institutions, and 
from time to time they create an economic environment where trade unionists are not 
present. Some of those schedules are popular with workers since they favour the role of 
unionists on the shopfloor, however, following ten years of suchlike administration, there 
is an increasing crisis of expectations when managers fail to deliver what they pledged 
(Ackers and Payne, 1998; Denham, 1996). Up to now, institutions have been 
marginalized, and for this reason, they have focused on defending fundamental employee 
rights. Nevertheless, they fall short of resources to accomplish this, which simply adds on 
their perceived lack of effectiveness in modernizing employment standards. The issue is 
not a choice between conflict and cooperation, but how can unionists grow into active 
agents and how can they get a central role on the shopfloor? To express the same thing 
differently, how can trade unionists develop their own hegemony to become joint 
architects in the wider society, and influence the industrial relations of Britain? 
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      Social partnership may well be a plan of action which makes provisions for devotion 
and versatility on the shop floor. Instead of drawing a merely nominal or artificial 
distinction between real and phantom employee involvement, stake holding is such a 
business policy that provides for labour institutions to climb up the escalator of 
participation (Ackers and Preston, 1997). How far trade unionists can succeed in 
increasing their authority is contingent on their ability to initiate things. Rather than 
perceive social partnership as an indication of something undesirable coming, or 
something to be disregarded, the new unionism considers it as an option. In the same 
manner that concepts like civil society, were an answer to the insufficiency of industrial 
relations, labour institutions can also hope that stake holding may be a means employed 
for gaining the advantage. In this way, the practice of team working, in spite of its ill 
defined character, performs as a spring of action that can mobilize the employees. To sum 
up the argument, as an alternative to the contention between aggressiveness and 
tolerance, opposition and collaboration, partnership can provide labour institutions in 
Britain with a chance to shape their destiny. 
 
Human Resources and Voice Mechanisms 
 
      The emergence of social partnership in Europe is arguably a critical development and 
research priority, however until now, hardly any empirical studies have been directed 
towards the evaluation of this general notion and several research issues continue to be 
unresolved. How can business ethics and stake holding be advanced and put into effect 
on the shop floor? How can such an innovative procedure be formulated or determined by 
The Evolution of Trade Unions in Britain 20 
nationwide trajectories of collective bargaining? Most importantly, taking into account 
the trend for British labour institutions to advocate novel ideas and different propositions, 
what is the theoretical and practical acquaintance of councillors and unionists with social 
partnership? 
      The last ten years was a decisive period for the economic and social evolution of 
trade unions. The comeback of left wing parliaments in the United Kingdom and other 
countries has resulted in the retreat of New Right leadership. As an alternative, an 
original socioeconomic order, founded on the Third Way, has already started to appear, 
which casts doubt upon the supremacy of the status quo. In other words, the effect on 
trade unionism is strong, albeit inferred rather than explicit. The concept of stake holding 
provides for government interference in the field of employment relations, with the 
intention to make sure that voice mechanisms are present for the deprived and 
underprivileged. In the United Kingdom for instance, this is manifest in the adoption of 
the National Minimum Wage and Statutory Trade Union Recognition. Social partnership 
is the foundation for a new form of bargaining between managers and workers that draws 
attention to the significance of consensual industrial relations. Of a great importance is 
the necessity for the social partners to change the character of their commitment from 
distributive local topics to integrative mutual gains topics such as education and practice 
(Lucio and Stuart, 2002). 
      The modus operandi of stake holding has a number of characteristics. It should not 
only be confined in the conveyance of a set of principles and philosophical ideas from 
America. The shift in politics, the change of governance and the current economic and 
social climate make it necessary to introduce a form of bargaining for the workplace 
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relations founded on the understanding of either side’s position. Even so, it is necessary 
to specify a sequence of significant viewpoints. A book entitled the Mutual Gains 
Enterprise, for instance, proposes an essential supporting structure that makes provisions 
for labour institutions to take part in the process of managing in traditionally anti-union 
firms in America (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). This publication brings to light a well 
thought out theory of the eighties, which disregarding minor exceptions, demonstrated 
that in spite of the financial difficulties of the period, employers and employees were able 
to realize the potential of innovative organizational strategies. The data for social 
partnership confirm this trend, maintaining that there is a variety of excellent companies 
in America that have attained this position because of their cooperation with trade 
unionists (ibid. 1994). Mutual gains organizations teach their employees specified skills 
by practice, make provisions for them to participate in activities and manage their 
workers in conformity with rules and regulations grounded upon fairness and equity. 
Labour institutions have a significant part in the promotion of this. The main objectives 
of mutual gains organizations are fulfilled, in agreement with the academic literature of 
industrial relations, when there is a loyal relationship between managers and workers. 
      This section inquires into the current publications on the gradual development of 
business ethics and stake holding. The section explores the attitudes of employees 
drawing empirically from a Manufacturing Science and Finance Union questionnaire. 
The MSF was among the major labour institutions in Britain, with 425,000 associates. It 
is now part of the Amicus trade union after merging with the Amalgamated Engineering 
and Electrical Union. The MSF itself was the result of a merger between the Association 
of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs and the Technical, Administrative and 
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Supervisory Section. Though for the most part it accounted for highly trained or 
experienced employees, mainly technical and scientific, it also dealt with a broad 
spectrum of employment relations issues and had a name for elaborating on 
groundbreaking policies, for example, around training and development, and organizing. 
Consequently, its employee delegates presented an exceptional database for assessing the 
evolution of social partnership. The rationale of the questionnaire was to classify, and not 
to interpret, focused on a presentation according to the latest requirements of the 
reformed character of employment relations and patterns of stake holding in main sectors 
of the Manufacturing Science and Finance Union. On account of the impact of social 
partnership upon the duties of councillors and unionists on the shop floor, the focus of 
this section on the behaviour and participation of employee representatives with regard to 
employment relations transformation is a very important topic of research. 
Chart 1: Sectoral Breakdown of Response 
 
 
  
Source: MSF, 2002.  
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      Fifty five per cent of trade unionists stated that they were given the chance to make 
known their feelings about important topics, in comparison with thirty per cent who 
stated that they were not. The changing nature of the relationship of employers and 
employees can, nevertheless, influence the conventional techniques of communication 
between institutions and associates. Sixty five percent of employee delegates admitted 
that unions may have to accept conditions of confidentiality on certain issues and manage 
their membership communications in new ways. The aerospace representatives of MSF 
acknowledged that a procedure like this could be controversial. 
      The influence of stake holding was, less evident with respect to work environment 
issues and other relevant topics. Twenty three per cent of trade unionists stated that 
management has become more committed to employment security, in contrast to forty 
two per cent who admitted that administration has not changed. A result which comes as 
no surprise taking into account that about two thirds of delegates stated that the principles 
of partnership have not been developed to a large degree. What is more, measures to 
improve the employability of staff have become an increasing priority according to 
twenty five per cent of trade union members, and opportunities for non-vocational 
training exist at the workplace according to twenty eight per cent. It is not surprising, that 
two thirds of Manufacturing Science and Finance unionists did not agree that there has 
been an increased investment by the organization in the quality of members’ working 
lives. The small expenditure conflicts with the prospects of the Manufacturing Science 
and Finance Union. For instance, when questioned upon the transformation of the work 
environment in recent times, the majority of the employee delegates agreed that the 
heaviness of responsibilities has augmented. 
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      The survey assessed the degree of Manufacturing Science and Finance Union 
participation in decision making. The extent of engagement was measured with regard to 
bargaining, conference and communication, and trade union members were also 
requested to state their opinion with respect to the highest degree of participation. 
Manufacturing Science and Finance Union engagement was more frequent as regards 
remuneration and work environment issues, and less common as concerns financial 
administration topics, sixty five per cent of delegates stated that they were participant in 
the making of remuneration policies though fifty six per cent admitted that they were not 
involved in financial administration. Medical care and security affairs indicated a 
substantial amount of bargaining and conference, and were major points in question. 
Only ten per cent of trade unionists stated that they were not engaged in those affairs. 
Table 1: Levels of Union Involvement (Valid Percentage) 
 
 Negotiate 
 
Consult Inform Not Involve 
Pay and working 
conditions 
65 13 11 12 
Health and safety 
 
32 45 13 10 
Equal 
opportunities 
23 36 21 21 
Levels of training 
investment 
5 22 38 36 
Training 
opportunities 
7 29 34 29 
Performance 
appraisal 
17 33 21 29 
Staff and human 
resources planning 
7 21 34 39 
Business 
investment 
1 11 32 56 
Family friendly 
policies 
26 25 18 31 
 
Source: MSF, 2002. 
      There is a variety of voice mechanisms with regard to the form of employee 
involvement. The results of the survey display that straight forward, collective modes of 
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representation were, on the whole, considered as the most prevalent. Employees stated 
that they passed on their own views by means of notice boards in eighty five per cent of 
instances and through news letters in seventy seven per cent. Regular sessions which 
normally include various activities instead of only a debate, were stated by eighty four 
per cent of trade unionists. The most unusual approach of collective representation was 
the employment of electronic media, which was reported by just twenty five per cent. 
Chart 2: Communication Mechanism (%) 
 
 
Source: MSF, 2002. 
      It has to be said that employee involvement is an indication of the stakeholder 
structure of an economy, but a theory like this can not easily be supported by empirical 
data, as some scholars have acknowledged. 
It should come as no surprise that stakeholder theory cannot be fully justified by instrumental 
considerations. The empirical evidence is inadequate, and the analytical arguments, although of 
considerable substance, ultimately rest on more than purely instrumental grounds. (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995) 
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The broadness of stakeholder theory and its complication are a possible interpretation for 
the insufficiency of empirical data to demonstrate the sovereignty of stakeholders 
(Freeman et al. 2003). 
      Even though it exists for a long time, business ethics is also hard to be measured. 
Business ethics has evolved as a conceptual extension of social morality, and is relevant 
to the ethical criteria of organizational entrepreneurship (Goodpaster, 1997). Important to 
business ethics are several moral criteria such as the concepts of integrity, honour, 
companionship, consideration, righteousness, justice, loyalty and equality (Lawrence et 
al. 2002).  
      At the outset, labour institutions were worried that the adoption of social partnership 
may bring about the erosion of the current relationship between employers and 
employees. The growing concern of managers about stake holding was considered, by 
unionists, as an effort to concentrate administration at the center and diverge from the 
previous course of action which was more interested in mimicking the American 
economy. The advocates of employee involvement, for instance, were thought to be 
preoccupied, with respect to their language, with the traditional maxim of tearing up the 
rule books and starting again. As a consequence there was an increased apprehension 
with regard to the effect of social partnership between employers and employees on the 
old relations of worker participation, there was also speculation over what kind of 
business ethics and stake holding should be adopted. From the employers’ perspective 
stake holding and business ethics stand for a general group of principles and values with 
respect to the relationship between managers and workers, for example, the advance of 
total quality management, a shift in the them and us feelings and the determination for the 
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resolution of common difficulties. This perception of social partnership as a 
transformation of the principles and values of workplace relations was not in agreement 
with the harder positions of trade unionists, who, by contrast, regarded stake holding as a 
good chance to extend the range of collective bargaining and negotiations. 
      The results have significant repercussions for the evolution of social partnership in 
the United Kingdom. Evidently, the engagement of institutions with stake holding, has no 
predetermined limit. Labour institutions decide on policies in relation to the efficiency 
and character of social partnership they come into, not only with regard to their evolution 
but also with respect to their capacity to deal with disagreement, controversy and 
deficiency. In other words, strategies are determined by employers’ concern with and 
capacity to deliver on current topics which are relevant to the development of stake 
holding due to the fact that employee delegates may have to expose themselves to 
uncertainty. As scholars have suggested, business ethics and stake holding are dependent 
on the concepts of mutual trust and efficacy on the shop floor (Higgins, 1996; Lucio and 
Stewart, 2002). In this manner, the notion of mutual trust demonstrates it is not fair for 
employees to chance the possibility of uncertainty if employers are not willing to take 
their own responsibilities, and the efficacy principle indicates it is not fair for managers 
to become subject to liabilities if workers are not ready to perform their own part of the 
deal. In the event that those prerequisites are missing, the two sides are more probable to 
participate in shrewd negotiations. The results display that labour institutions may have to 
become involved in social partnership in a careful manner. Most importantly, they exhibit 
that, taking into account the absence of reciprocal agreements on the shop floor, 
employers and employees appear to be favourably disposed towards the maintenance of 
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shrewd negotiations as a more likely alternative to the manifestation of a mutuality-based 
industrial relations system. 
 
New Deal for Union Organizing 
 
      The central objective of this section is to research the conveyance of the organizing 
model to Britain. For this reason it provides empirical evidence from a TUC 
questionnaire and other examples. Firstly, it investigates the degree to which enlistment 
in British labour institutions has been affected by the organizing model and incorporates 
an organizing approach. A literature review of the current publications on institutional 
strategies is also provided to investigate the extent to which nationwide trajectories have 
been adjusted to the organizing model and establish the circumstances which promote or 
restrict its employment. Secondly, it inquires into case studies of employee mobilization 
which draw on the organizing model with a view to determine its advantages and 
disadvantages with reference to British trade unions. In contrast with organized courses 
of action in the United States of America, collective organization in the United Kingdom 
points to a less militant course of action (Waldinger et al. 1998). In an effort to 
understand organizational change, the section gives examples drawn upon the public and 
the private sectors, which incorporate simple but skilful assignments, an endeavour to 
produce coordination and guarantee acceptance in a developing institution, an endeavour 
to revitalize recruitment in a recognized labour institution and an endeavour to reinforce 
participation in a growing but formerly disregarded faction of employees, such as 
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apprenticed to managers. Prior to the display of any data, nevertheless, it is imperative to 
analyze the concept of the organizing model in depth. 
      The notions which formulated a collection of specific organizational principles and 
the organizing model have been affiliated with a number of contributing factors of good 
practice. 
Reliance on planned organizing campaigns, in which the union researches targets and sets clear 
and timed objectives which are subject to periodic review, reliance on paid lead organizers to 
oversee organizing campaigns and foster activism among the target workforce, involvement of 
activists in the development and running of campaigns through a representative organizing 
committee, the use of mapping techniques to identify all members of the workforce and rank 
them systematically in terms of their propensity to become active in the union, the identification 
of issues, and grievances around which a campaign can be developed, the use of actions to 
mobilize the workforce, which can range from badge-wearing and the signing of a petition 
through to street theater and protest strikes. (Heery et al. 2000) 
We have to determine the degree to which organizing unionism, has an impact on the 
industrial relations of the United Kingdom. We can also observe the more radical 
organizational transformation that has taken place in the employment relations of the 
United States of America through similar policies. 
Use of one-to-one recruitment in which trained, volunteer recruiters seek to persuade non-
members to join either at the workplace or through house calls, reliance on the principle of like-
recruits-like, such that recruiters have the same demographic and occupational identity to those 
being recruited, the demonstration of union effectiveness in the course of the campaign by 
publicizing concessions from the employer, the identification of the levers, allies and pressure 
points which can be used to discourage employer opposition and press for union recognition, and 
the development of community support so that the campaign extends beyond the workplace to 
embrace community, political and consumer organizations. (ibid. 2000) 
The Evolution of Trade Unions in Britain 30 
      The findings of the TUC survey indicate that in the United Kingdom there is not a 
uniform employment of the techniques and practices related to organization. Labour 
institutions have used frequently one-to-one recruitment and close to fifty per cent have 
used petitions, polls or demonstrations to strengthen their own presence on the shop floor. 
Other distinct methods, nevertheless, like systematic rating of non-members and 
establishing an organizing committee amongst the target workforce, are restricted to a 
small number of labour institutions and the efforts to diffuse collective organization are 
limited and are stated in just a few occasions. Labour institutions, such as the Iron and 
Steel Trades Confederation and the Graphical, Paper and Media Union were greatly 
affected by the organizing model and they used to be considered by some as the leaders 
of the movement (Waldinger et al. 1998). 
Table 2: Organizing Methods and Principles 
 
 All unions 
(percentage) 
Large unions 
(percentage) 
Academy unions 
(percentage) 
Establishing 
membership targets 
29 54 44 
Establishing an 
organizing committee 
21 39 50 
Identification of issues 
as basis for recruitment 
34 31 38 
Raising the profile 
through surveys 
45 62 63 
Systematic rating of 
non-members 
7 15 19 
One-to-one recruitment 
at the workplace 
69 92 75 
Reliance on like-
recruits-like 
26 50 33 
House calls to non-
members homes 
2 0 6 
Link-up to community 
organizations 
3 0 0 
Public campaigns 
against anti-union 
5 17 13 
 
Source: TUC, 2000. 
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      The answers regarding the principles and methods of collective organization 
demonstrate a greater effect. Large numbers of employee delegates state that enlistment 
often highlights the need for members to resolve own problems through effective 
workplace organization, justice and respect at work, worker solidarity, opportunity to 
participate in union democracy and membership becoming a democratic right. Although 
the results to some extent illustrate the impact of collective organization they correspond 
to the old policies of vigorous action advocated by several labour institutions in the 
United Kingdom and the commitment of unionists to a political cause. A variety of 
coalitions, such as the Institution of Professionals, Managers and Specialists, National 
Association for Teachers in Further and Higher Education, Public and Commercial 
Services Union, Society of Telecom Executives and Transport Salaried Staffs 
Association stated that confidence in recruitment strategies was growing as a 
consequence of the decentralization of industrial relations and that this was a motive for 
supporting collective organization. 
Chart 3: Messages 
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Source: TUC, 2000. 
      The evidence draws attention to distinctive characteristics of collective organization 
and enlistment. First of all, it points out, that the approach of collective organization is 
affiliated with the evolution of institutional strategies. Components of these policies 
embody the adjustment to well ordered recruitment activity, a well structured enlistment 
process, the assignment of lay volunteers, the foundation of an economic programme and 
the funding of research and development on labour institutions. The TUC emphasizes 
that the diffusion of collective organization in the last few years has caused the 
modernization of employment relations and, in spite of significant constraints has been a 
success story. Second, the data indicates that the employment of collective organization is 
related to knowledge acquired by training, and those institutions responsive to influence 
from abroad are more susceptible to organizational change and transformation. Third, the 
findings demonstrate that collective organization is also affiliated with an enlargement 
policy and an emphasis upon female apprentices, junior employees, foreign labour, 
workers on contingent contracts, non members, staff on temporary agreements and those 
at the rough end of the market. The connection between collective organization and 
efforts to strengthen the representation of labour institutions, evident in the United States 
of America, is coming to the United Kingdom (Heery et al, 2000; Weaver, 1998). 
      An organized course of action launched by the Communication Workers Union 
indicated a great deal of employee discontentment as a consequence of one sided 
incremental adjustments in working standards. An urge to enlarge membership prompted 
the institution to act in a corresponding manner and as a result it has directed an operation 
to mobilize the employees and guarantee acceptance. The union has set a number of goals 
such as, to give intellectual, moral, and social instruction to workers, especially as a 
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formal and prolonged process, attract lay volunteers to formulate a commission to enlist 
members on the shop floor, specify topics in relation to employee involvement, enroll 
trade unionists and support collective organization and egalitarian principles, provide 
services for the workers for a particular purpose, especially to arouse public interest, for 
example before a political election, and succeed in obtaining acknowledgement and 
establish that increased funding in the Communication Workers Union can expand 
unionism in other sectors (CWU, 2000). Due to the fact that the institution had no 
recognition, the organized course of action was carried out by an employee delegation, 
assembled and managed by a lead organizer from the Academy. A systematic rating of 
non-members was attempted and the outcome was the recruitment of more than one 
hundred unionists pressing for the acceptance of the union and demanding to be treated 
fairly, with respect and dignity. The commission specified topics of great importance for 
the employees, like the harassment of workers by callers and the necessity to receive 
requests like those of an offensive nature. These points were sharply defined as they were 
important to the workers and regarded as winnable. It was thought that management was 
exposed to damage by criticism and that influence might be exercised on the firms 
providing for and partially financing the telecommunications industry. There was a 
previous decision by TypeCo where employees have the liberty to advise clients they are 
not permitted to make requests of an indecent content and workers also have the power to 
cancel a request when they are harassed. 
      The diffusion of collective organization by the labour institutions of the United 
Kingdom is primarily attempted in established foundations where enlistment of members 
is cost effective. Another operation serves as an example and is quite important inasmuch 
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as it attempts the application of an organizing approach to in-fill enrolment. It was 
initiated by the Public Service Union, in the late nineties at Regal, a major National 
Health Service Trust with a high percentage of trade unionists but without sufficient rules 
and regulations and has been conducted successfully up to now by an Academy 
apprentice. This trade union has set a number of goals such as, to modernize recruitment 
and attempt a systematic rating of non-members, broaden the constituency of lay 
volunteers, enhance the general reputation of the Public Service Union, develop 
employee involvement and participation, enlist trade unionists, and guarantee employer 
concessions for the employees (UNISON, 2000). Like in the case of the Communication 
Workers Union, the organized course of action started by a lead organizer who contacted 
unionists to find out if they want to get involved in the operation. The workers who 
responded formed a core territory and organized a commission that was composed of 
about fifteen delegates from a variety of professional and vocational backgrounds. 
Moreover, a number of workplace contacts were also appointed to take part in enrolment 
but they were not prepared to join the commission. 
      A third operation was launched by the former Society of Telecom Executives, which 
changed its name to Connect, and was directed by an Academy trainee who investigated 
the recruitment difficulties in British Telecom. As the organized course of action got 
underway, so did the investigation and the institution reported that most workers were 
satisfied with the firm’s new enlistment process. The purpose of the operation was to 
improve the public image of the union as well as to collect data which can be analyzed to 
support the new enrollment procedure. The aims of the institution were as follows, to 
discuss the concerns of employees affiliated with the Society of Telecom Executives, 
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undertake a systematic rating of non-members as a foundation for enlistment, produce 
statistics about the union, display the efficiency of the institution by supporting the 
diffusion of collective organization, and build up a nationwide structure of delegates 
among trade unionists (STE, 2000). 
      Unions that have adopted both the organizing and partnership models will be more 
effective at external organizing than unions that have adopted one or neither. Regional 
organization and institutional activity are probable to have a great effect on the efficiency 
of organizing (Charlwood, 2001). Labour institutions can affect institutional activity and 
regional organization by means of vocational training which they offer to place 
apprentices on the shopfloor. Nevertheless the objectives of this strategy are probable to 
differ within institutions as much as they differ between institutions, which brings to light 
inconsistencies in human resource management, the organizational behaviour and culture 
of the full time representatives and trade unionists involved, and the special prominence 
of collective bargaining for labour institutions (Fairbrother, 2000; Willman, 2001). 
Institutions will become more efficient if they are managed democratically since 
democracy helps the management to become sensitive to the needs of unionists. If an 
institution is responsive to the needs of unionists they are more probable to stay in 
membership than if the institution is indifferent (Delaney et al. 1993). This has an 
influence on the role of unionists on the shopfloor. The advocates of the revival of 
collective organization maintain that leadership accountability is required as a 
precondition for the resurgence of labour institutions. Internal organizing effectiveness 
will be higher in workplaces where the union is militant, compared to workplaces where 
the union is co-operative and workplaces where the union is marginalized.            
The Evolution of Trade Unions in Britain 36 
A Spirit Reborn of Rational Pluralism 
 
      In this section I will make an effort to describe a neo-pluralism, which may provide 
for an essential supporting structure for the revitalization of employment relations as they 
are perceived today. This analysis adds on the special importance attached to labour 
institutions by Oxford Pluralist scholars like Clegg and Flanders, reclaims part of their 
early understanding of political and economic effect, and reframes this general notion for 
an alternative workplace relations system. My argument is that the problem of order, 
which has been identified by industrial relations on the shopfloor, has switched to the 
interaction of business and community. Political science by attaching special prominence 
to the shop floor and by omitting well defined moral issues, has detached itself from the 
continuous procedure of economic transformation and disengaged from the current 
discussion on the employment relationship and the cooperation of firms with other actors. 
Subsequently, I propose a distinct methodology for analyzing the industrial relations 
system, by reviewing a number of different ideas with reference to the ongoing 
developments on political issues and the controversial interdependence of business and 
community. This part stems from a variety of theoretical assumptions and employment 
relations concepts, from outside traditional public policy. A series of contemporary 
topics, like economic failure and success, employer societies and trade unions, industrial 
democracy and business ethics, support mechanisms and partnership, and collective 
organization, for the most part indicate a reformed employment relations system. 
Although the latest vocabulary illustrates the transformed nature of the interrelation of 
business and community, it also reminds us of the social science of Durkheim, which 
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inspired industrial relations pluralism and third way policy making. My proposition 
essentially differs from the paradigm of Marxism, and recommends that a new form of 
pluralism may present a more credible variant for the reinvigoration of employment 
relations, by concentrating on the expansion of decision making organizations and 
practices. I conclude with a fresh interpretation of employment relations for our time. 
      Scholars have attempted to revise traditional pluralism in a new, intriguing and 
compelling manner. 
Functionalist tradition has dominated the field historically, although usually implicitly and 
without the theoretical apparatus often associated with functionalism in mainstream sociological 
theory, the focus is on the subsystem, which may be analyzed in the explicitly functionalist 
perspective primarily in relations to the larger system of which it is a part. The root metaphor is 
the organism, however disguised. The primary unit of analysis is the institution. Major issues 
relate to the historical development of institutions, the relationship between institutions and their 
environments and institutional interrelationships, especially collective bargaining. Institutional 
theory in general is concerned with cultures, structures, and routines, with the way in which 
institutions become embedded in culture, and internalized by individuals, but the focus is on 
institution and culture, not on the individual interest. This orientation is obviously more 
congenial to sociologists than to economists. (Martin, 1999) 
A statement like this may be astonishing for several industrial relations experts. To start 
with, many will take it for granted that this is a case of classical Marxism instead of 
revision. In fact, the organic descriptive term is regularly affiliated with a competing 
viewpoint, Human Resource Management, as a variant of Parson’s general agreement 
doctrine (Ackers, 2002; Dunn, 1990). Employment relations theorists who are seeking for 
a socioeconomic lineal descent, are more probable to agree with different concepts or 
assumptions (Gerth and Mills, 1991). Nevertheless, this definition brings to light an 
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enduring and significant theory, that pluralism is a system of ideas, concerned with 
economic solidity and social harmony. Another argument is that the defining terms 
regulation and system can also have a conformist meaning. Solidity is necessary, because 
without harmony there could be no statutory legislation. This description is evidently 
about the new problem of order. Even so, it does not contribute to unitarism or general 
agreement. Scholars have also defined that, differential interests require continuous 
reconciliation, independently of the process of production (Martin, 1999). In my opinion, 
this explanation of industrial relations implicates some additional progress. A new form 
of pluralism should be focused upon trade unions, but instead of the more comprehensive 
and variable social science of Durkheim, one which is closer to Parson’s social consensus 
doctrine (Ackers, 1999). In contrast with the seventies and the eighties when the trend 
was to disregard links between employment and society, there is now a revived 
enthusiasm among politicians and economists for the concept of integration. 
Table 3: Pluralism and Neo-Pluralism Compared 
 
Pluralism Neo-Pluralism 
Interests Interests and values 
Workplace conflict and economic order Social breakdown and social cohesion 
Trade unions and collective bargaining Moral communities and social institutions 
The forward march of labour Civil society and democratic rights 
The frontier of control Relationship capitalism and stakeholding 
Joint regulation Ethical employment regulation 
 
Source: Ackers, 2002. 
      For other writers, the reason for community failure is the international neo-liberal 
political framework, as it is not in accordance with adjustment of the correct type. 
In fact one reason why the past twenty-five years in world history have seen such profound 
social transformation is that such pre-capitalist elements, hitherto essential parts of the operation 
of capitalism, have finally become too eroded by capitalist development to play the vital role 
they once did. I am thinking here, of course, of the family. (Hobsbawm, 1997) 
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The family is most important in the academic discussion on social decline on both sides 
of the Atlantic. A critical analysis of Marxism, gives an account of a historic crisis of 
capitalism, defined by the longing for a secure identity and social order in a disintegrating 
world (Hobsbawm, 1994). From this perspective, society will face the consequences for 
economic disorder, which breaks down the notions of duty and trust and finishes by 
sawing off at least one of the branches on which it sat. This failure is not necessarily in 
connection with the disintegration of orderliness on the shopfloor, as it was perceived 
during the sixties and the seventies. To a certain extent is a degeneration of business 
ethics that originates from the political environment, and spreads throughout the economy 
and the community. As a consequence, the capitalist society decomposes, every political 
and economic relationship which does not help to bring about revenues, and substitutes 
this with a relationship of marketing and purchasing. This self destruction thesis has a 
long lineal descent that goes back to Marxism, as it has been illustrated (Adler, 1998). 
Table 4: Marxism and Neo-Pluralism Compared 
 
Marxism 
 
Neo-Pluralism 
Socialism 
 
Social market capitalism and liberal democracy 
Workers mobilization and capitalist crisis 
 
Social regulation and partnership 
Economic militancy and strikes Stakeholder consultation, employee involvement 
and integrative bargaining 
Organized labour EU, UK state, unions, public opinion, enlightened 
employers and managers 
 
Source: Kelly, 1998. 
      As I have demonstrated, employment relations pluralism was founded on the concept 
of Durkheim of moral communities and the important part that social institutions can 
play. From this point of view, industrial relations pluralism provided for a doctrine of 
social cohesion between managers and unionists. This notion became less significant as 
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employment relations pluralism was diminished to a realistic definition of shop floor 
militancy, to the extent that it was eventually mixed with Parson’s social consensus 
theory. The proposition that, in the times of Human Resource Management and 
stakeholding, the answer is a mixture of pluralism and unitarism, is based upon the wrong 
presumption that the latter is not associated with political unity (Provis, 1996). During the 
sixties and seventies, Parson’s general agreement doctrine, created the impression that 
industrial relations pluralism was about controversy per se, particularly when it appeared 
as radical pluralism during the eighties and nineties. At the beginning, nevertheless, 
employment relations pluralism was regarded by labour institutions and other 
organizations as a framework for the restriction of workplace dispute. As a result, it is 
extraordinary, to find out that some writers have argued for the concept of Durkheim so 
as to explain the issue of socioeconomic failure (Ackers, 2005). 
      The notion of civil society is critical in this discussion. In addition, it brings back a 
neglected issue in industrial relations pluralism. Dealing with matters having to do with 
practical requirements, labour institutions in the UK are reminiscent of the guilds which 
are perceived as fundamental in the formation of employment relations (Brown, 1998). 
What is more, trade unions and normative organizations are regarded as the foundation 
stones of industrial relations pluralism (Rowley, 1998). From this perspective, labour 
institutions are not only important as mechanisms to oppose management authority on the 
shopfloor, as employment relations scholars describe them, but as participants in an 
egalitarian and moral society where members can also attain workplace integration and 
social cohesion. This notion was fundamental for the theoretical assumptions of Clegg 
and Flanders, and illustrates the devotion of British industrial relations pluralism to the 
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causes of the working class in history. Employment relations pluralism has shown its 
allegiance to dynamic and resilient policies, which in the past incorporated a strong and 
active collaboration front. Furthermore, the emergence of social democratic governments 
creates an environment for trade unions that is closer to conventional industrial relations 
instead of value-added ideas taken from Human Resource Management. From another 
point of view, the weakening of labour institutions has caused a representation gap on the 
shop floor, damaged the relationship between business and community, and also impaired 
the relations of managers and workers. The directives, rules and regulations of the 
European Union provide for an innovative structure for these issues. 
      It has become more widely accepted that workers are small owners and clients apart 
from wage-earners, and that those multidimensional qualities cause a unique, and 
occasionally contradictory apprehension of the entrepreneurial functions (Heery, 1993). 
In this manner, the vocabulary of stakeholding may expand the concept of industrial 
relations pluralism on the shopfloor to incorporate managers, shareholders, as well as the 
labour movement. The research on partnership, suggests that a new form of pluralism 
would not only have a bearing on the settlement of disputes, but also have an influence 
on the reconciliation of duties (Ackers, 2001). The idea of an employment relationship 
has been interpreted, up to now, with regard to finances, as the necessity for managers 
and workers to increase production (Ackers, 2002). On the other hand, this is not a 
routine, which can be achieved in a forceful manner. The industrial relations system can 
engage an element of force, however, it also needs other forms of collaboration founded 
upon enduring relations of fidelity and mutual support. Partnership and business ethics 
advocate the concept that a contract is not sufficient unto itself, but it implies definite 
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extrinsic and non financial communal principles. In brief, such a relationship must be 
apprehended as a human and moral relationship as well as a financial affair. 
      All included these different notions offer some arguments regarding socioeconomic 
integration and the industrial relations. First, the cause and effect of communal decline 
can be defined as political egoism and financial corruption, and we have to tackle them 
both at the same time and in combination if we want to restrain and overturn the 
corrosion of socioeconomic integration. Second, though communal decline produces an 
effect on everybody, it is the impoverished and financially insecure, and their 
descendants, who are mostly subjected to failed households, run-down districts, 
substandard education and irregular, part-time, unsteady occupation. Those are the 
members of society that labour institutions and employment relations accommodated 
sufficiently until the seventies and the eighties, but have recently been neglected 
(Giddens, 2000). They have increasingly found it difficult to integrate into a fragmented 
society. There is a tendency for societal discrimination taking into consideration the fact 
that, elite circles emerge as exclusive societies, and abstain from state schooling and 
welfare. This deteriorates the standard of living for the poverty stricken, but also 
escalates societal disintegration. Lastly, a community requires well specified moral 
standards to subsist and political organizations to support them. Capitalist and socialist 
governments alike can erode the ethical principles on which community relies, and the 
role of trade unions is to revitalize them, by means of democratic rights. Notwithstanding 
that, a government may have an important part to take in establishing and authorizing a 
civil society. It remains to be seen how this societal integration can supplement and 
improve traditional employment relations pluralism. 
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      A new form of pluralism gives an opportunity for the revitalization of industrial 
relations. This becomes evident in the relevance of the early concepts of pluralism, 
unitarism, and voluntarism to the late developments of British employment relations. The 
new form of pluralism primarily focuses on the question of orderliness and the dual 
relationship of business and community. Additionally, it offers a distinct moral 
background for strategies such as employee involvement which, up to now, have been 
discarded as temporary, opportunistic notions to enhance management authority (Kelly, 
1998). We must consider that in the industrial relations literature, Fox found no conflict 
between the underlying theoretical assumptions of Durkheim and a realistic concept of 
pluralism (Ackers et al. 2003). From this perspective, a spirit of rational pluralism may 
provide a framework for the coordination of business and community, and a cooperative 
mode of operation to lead employment relations into a new age. Instead of anticipating, 
desperately, a return to old-fashioned political activism, or an ethical post-modern 
culture, a new form of pluralism provides an essential supporting structure which draws 
attention to the relationship between employment and society. Most importantly, neo-
plurarism brings forward a new theory for the special importance attached to regulation 
by industrial relations, and in particular labour institutions. Altogether, this proposes a 
different explanation of employment relations for today. 
 
A Synthesis of Trust and Mobilization 
 
      During the eighties and nineties, like in other European countries, British unionists 
came up against efforts jointly arranged by politicians and managers to disintegrate the 
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organized employees, unitarist stratagems in industries with a high membership, and 
disadvantageous policies with reference to workplace relations. The authority of labour 
institutions declined. In this context, the New Labour, with its support for social 
partnership, offers the chance to form a modus operandi which makes provisions for a 
favourable industrial relations terrain, in which unions can regain the initiative and work 
to rebuild their institutional presence in British society. The representatives of 
organizations have reflected on this. 
If you’ve had years and years of something that’s horrible, and something comes along that’s not 
quite so horrible, you support it. Partnership’s not so horrible because we use it as a code-word 
for recognition. It is an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the other party. With partnership 
comes the rediscovery of pluralistic industrial relations. (IPA, 1997) 
In addition, some influential entrepreneurs like the President of the Confederation of 
British Industry, have provided a comparable explanation, although from another 
perspective talking about a possibly damaging build up of trade union influence, hidden 
behind the new buzzword partnership (CBI, 1999). 
      Social partnership has not been clearly described by scholars. It has, for instance, 
been affiliated with single union arrangements or, more usually, related to engagement in 
human resource management schemes (Kelly, 1996). Other scholars have described 
social partnership by way of dedication to a group of values which do not incorporate 
acknowledgement of independent employee representation (Guest and Peccei, 1998). 
Like other workplace relations and human resource management ideas that recently 
emerged, it has been exposed to a number of explanations and definitions. The research 
of social partnership case studies also displays a substantial amount of modernization and 
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organizational transformation. As a matter of course, its importance varies between the 
cases and is contingent on the extent of employee involvement. 
      British employee relations are traditionally defined by conflict or opposition rather 
than cooperation. Apart from artificial or extravagant language, British institutions have 
not regularly challenged the proprietorship and the associated rights or privileges of 
employers compared with the French unions’ syndicalist tradition, for example. The 
argument is that the preferences of British institutions were relevant to industrial 
regulation instead of the control of ownership. It is also frequently acknowledged that 
conflict or opposition has for the most part been compromised. As a result, the 
adversarial form contains its inconsistencies, originating from the small ambitions of 
labour institutions, and the efforts to moderate most of the reciprocal action between 
employers and employees. As writers have observed, unions have almost always been 
content to seek the best available deal within the socioeconomic order as it is, the 
complex interaction of class, politics and collective bargaining has often attracted the title 
labourism, an admixture of beliefs, institutions and practices which could enable 
remarkable displays of militancy and determination yet in effect proved typically 
defensive and hence accommodative (Allen and Haynes, 2001; Hyman, 1996). 
      The appraisal of contemporary social Partnership is clarified by a couple of examples 
in the United Kingdom. The case studies were selected inasmuch as they are good 
examples of the finance and retail industries, and owing to the fact that there is a 
persistent concentration on manufacturing case studies in the academic literature. 
      A Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 firm, Legal & General is one of Britain’s 
leading enterprises. Approximately 8,000 employees work for the company, 6,000 of 
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them are based in Britain. A conventional firm founded on tradition, has throughout the 
1990s effectively followed a new ground breaking policy, built upon highly competitive 
financial services. From the early nineties to the late nineties, the company profits and 
regular trade expanded by more than one hundred and forty percent (Legal & General, 
1998). A distinct characteristic of the enterprise is the priority given to social 
responsibility. Legal & General, contributes yearly over 0.5 percent of British assets to 
public benefits foundations and other funding projects and its social responsibility is 
reflected on the company accounts (ibid. 1998). 
      From the manager’s perspective there was an increased apprehension about the 
relationship with workers and that procedures agreed with the union 15 or 20 years ago 
may have prevented necessary decisions being taken as quickly as needed during a time 
of rapid change within the industry. One of the chief executives engaged in union-
management relations reported that, to manage change and go forward we needed to 
improve communication with staff and get them to understand the rationale for change 
(IRS, 1998). A notable feature of this was the substitution of the old style adversarial 
system of industrial relations with a cooperative culture and an emphasis on principles of 
trust and mutual respect by each party for the other’s contribution to employment 
relations. From this point of view, an innovative human resource management 
proposition like this can not be placed into the old Procrustean bed. 
      Managers and unionists decided by mutual consent to form a coalition in the late 
nineties to establish their joint interests and to realize the potential of the goals of the 
recent arrangement.  The Partnership Agreement was settled within a year. It included the 
familiar attributes of industrial arrangements as specified below. 
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Differing interests are recognized and respected and MSF’s right to represent its members is 
recognized, as well as management’s right and duty to manage, mutual legitimation, conflicts are 
to be avoided, cooperative processes, and there is to be full and early participation in decision 
making, joint decision making or consultation. (LRD, 1998) 
Though one of the targets was to work together to further the success of the business by 
enabling a flexible approach, attention was directed to work security in an Appendix on 
operation of the agreement. The apprehensiveness of chief executives that the change 
process could excessively restrain their own capacity for formal judgments was 
highlighted by the recommendation for management’s right and duty to manage. 
Significantly for the institution there was a pledge by managers to support MSF’s 
recruitment efforts, where appropriate. Apart from strengthening its position in the 
partnership agreement, the institution was interested in the accomplishment of justice and 
impartiality for the employees and the obliteration of prejudice in the workplace. 
      Management and union viewed personal advancement as an integral part of the 
agreement. The firm supported delegation and the participation of workers and accepted 
that involvement in decision making and exposure to the company’s operating processes 
and structures and business pressures would provide valuable experience that no training 
course could (Legal & General, 1998). To attain this objective the firm employed a lead 
supervisor, who was personally accountable for the improvement of expertise and 
skillfulness of the unionized delegates in order to facilitate them to work more efficiently. 
      Following a long period of economic development in a booming industry, Tesco 
emerged in the late nineties as the largest supermarket chain in Britain with reference to 
sales volume. Prior to this the retailing company had managed to discard its stack them 
high, sell them cheap reputation. For Tesco Stores Ltd, gross revenue in the late nineties 
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averaged £639 million, total business amounted to £14,515 million and current assets 
£1,999 million (Tesco, 1998). The firm kept in its service 158,484 staff, 70 percent was 
women and 65 percent on temporary agreements (ibid. 1998). 
      During the nineties, nevertheless, the old fashioned voice mechanisms and the formal 
union-management cooperation framework were taken to be restraining the worker 
participation thought as necessary to implement critical modifications and satisfy 
consumers’ needs. The firm had not revised its industrial arrangement with the Union of 
Shop Distributive and Allied Workers. In reality, it had advised employees not only to 
continue their association with the trade union, but to play an active part in its activities 
(Allen and Haynes, 2001). Workplace relations had been virtually restricted to the 
occasional discussion of the Retail Agreement, defined as ritualized by managers as well 
as trade unionists, and to regulatory delegation of a small extent. Managers thought that 
the conventional modes of operation, and the yearly general meetings in specific, were 
obsolete, unsatisfactory and inappropriate to a modern industrial relations system. 
Discontent had come to a climax by the annual negotiation of the partnership, and 
managers observed institutional strategies on topics of great significance to the company 
to be decided by employees in other firms and industries. Apart from this, management 
wanted to take counsel with trade unionists and was not inclined to transmit information 
exclusively through the institution. 
      Negotiations developed in a specific way and direction as managers and unionists 
wanted more flexible industrial relations. Although the opinions of the two sides were 
distinct, there was a consensus about the general notions related to social partnership. 
Particularly, the delegates of the Union of Shop Distributive and Allied Workers 
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specified topics of distress for unionists at an early stage, and made an effort to solve the 
problems. Though Tesco acknowledged the part of the institution as managers’ consultant 
on issues associated with business ethics, the institution was regarded as an opposing 
force with a large degree of self determination, less likely to be found in non-union 
varieties of employee involvement or empowerment, and its own liberties. 
      Subsequent to a process of testing qualities in four outlets in 1998, local meetings 
were organized by all retailers in the following year. Most of these local meetings took 
place in the stores during the summer months. A major National Forum was held in April 
1999. The debate and negotiations in the forum and meetings were about a variety of 
topics. Until now a number of the topics discussed by the partners in the meetings have 
been dealt successfully in the workplace. This is a depiction of questions attempted to 
answer. 
What about a good rise this year? When we open a new store do we automatically close small 
stores in the same team? Why are we offering more 3 for 2 offers than 2 for 1 offers? Can we put 
a VAT button on tills/customer service desk? (IDS, 1998) 
Both managers and unionists portrayed the discussions as a success story, and they also 
gave an account of the passion and the determination of the partners to resolve the 
difficulties. Admittedly some delegates of the Union of Shop Distributive and Allied 
Workers have not bought in, but the two sides accept that the new arrangement is an 
ongoing procedure. Even though all the prospects have not been realized, the two sides 
feel confident about the cooperation and the future of the relationship. A revision of the 
agreed terms was proposed, and an Annex in the Partnership Agreement makes reference 
to the right for cancellation, which makes it essential for the two parties to make further 
progress. 
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      Under the circumstances in consideration most of the influence of labour institutions 
stems from their own capacity to increase worker participation in the companies, and to 
make certain they conform to organizational transformation. Otherwise, the disorder that 
is likely to emerge as a consequence of the marginalization or displacement of 
institutions can also restrain the cooperative attitude. Many large retailers, for instance, 
are greatly exposed to work strikes in the dispersal of goods among consumers that 
damage a sophisticated inventory management, which relies on just-in-time methods. The 
extensively regulated distributional operations are defined by an antagonistic relationship 
(Tesco, 1998). Especially in the finance and retail industries, contention is relevant to the 
good quality of product distribution, arguably an important consideration for the viability 
of the firms. Accordingly, the circumstances in the case studies portrayed the inclination 
of the directors to select a policy that incorporated the acknowledgement of trade unions 
whereas the early efforts to reinforce the participation of workers had not been 
successful. Furthermore, partnership agreements are taken to secure legitimacy and 
respectability, both regarded as significant characteristics of a virtuous circle which 
results in the attachment of employees to the company. From the employers’ point of 
view the virtuous circle was described as a process where they, the employees, serve as 
we manage (Barber et al. 1999). Of great significance is the possibility of advantageous 
statutory amendments. The managers in the cases analyzed were convinced that if they 
had not been willing to dismantle the labour institutions before the organizational 
transformation taking place in the late nineties, they were not prepared to do it later. This 
partially confirms the hypothesis that the coexistence of social partnership and collective 
organization, also helps the increase of organizational trust (Deitz, 2005).   
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      Taking into account the mutual gains from incremental adjustment, one side pursuing 
to assist transformation and the other to affect it, partnership agreements are strongly 
related to the improvement of business functions, particularly as regards the 
rearrangement of industrial relations (Nissen, 1997). In the two case studies both sides 
displayed to the full extent conformity to organizational transformation. Managers 
realized the potential for increased worker participation in decision-making and unionists 
the chance to make an impact on the procedure and its results. 
Clearly, the expectations of the parties are critical. They limit the other party’s room to 
manoeuvre, while disappointed expectations, particularly of the other party’s behaviour, may 
result in withdrawal from cooperation. (Allen and Haynes, 2001). 
The clashing of opposed principles in partnership agreements is determined by the degree 
to which the unionists are engaged in issues that they recognize as significant which are 
not essentially compatible with those of the managers, as recognized by them, and the 
other way round. 
      The chief executives and the employee delegates in the case studies assumed a 
rational calculus of advantages and disadvantages to decide on the nature of cooperation. 
While there was not a general agreement on all the issues discussed, union-management 
relations illustrate the determination of the two sides for a cooperative workplace. 
Therefore a favourable terrain regarding the aspirations of the associates has made it 
possible to proceed with the new relationship. The two sides have made an effort to give 
a definite shape to the partnership agreement by consolidating the framework and 
authorizing the conditions to cope with the usual strains. However, the evidence indicates 
that social partnership may be susceptible to pressures from outside the organization and 
to ill defined prospects. 
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      By applying the intellectual process of synthesis, I demonstrated that partnership 
unionism is consistent with collective organization. In fact, the American model of union 
organizing appears to be complementary to a Rhenish version of social partnership. It is 
by means of simultaneously offering a good chance and bringing external pressure that 
labour institutions have the capacity and the power to enjoy the advantageous 
circumstances of union-management cooperation. This study suggests that institutions 
must support a cooperative relationship on the understanding that the environmental 
factors are in favour. The analysis in this section defies the general notion that union 
incorporation is essentially dormant and subservient, and usually results in disintegration. 
 
The Sword of Justice and Voluntary Recognition 
 
      The number of trade unionists increased by one hundred thousand at the turn of the 
century after about twenty years of continuous decrease, the lengthiest period in the 
history of unionism (Metcalf, 2001). This section examines the decline of trade unionism 
and attempts to answer the question if the late developments point to regeneration. 
      The organizational structure of unionism in Britain has also changed. The number of 
labour institutions used to be around 1,300 before World War II and it was about 800 
afterwards (Metcalf, 2002). Coalitions, acquisitions, and the decrease in membership for 
several organizations such as the Jewish Bakers and Sheffield Wool Sheep Shearers have 
forced this number to 225. In fact, 10 labour institutions in Britain make up for nearly 
seventy-five per cent of trade unionists today. However, smaller labour institutions still 
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exist like the Association of Somerset Inseminators and the Church and Oswaldwistle 
Power Loom Overlookers Society. 
      In close association with the decrease in membership is a complete transformation 
that has taken place in the field of collective action. The Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey provides the evidence. In the mid-eighties in sites with more than twenty-five 
workers there was not any fluctuation in the number of places with no collective 
representation, this persisted at about fifteen per cent. By the late nineties, nevertheless, 
there was a steep decline in voice arrangements where unions formed the single channel 
of communication and a less marked decline in dual channel voice involving union and 
non-union channels in combination (Bryson, 2000). But those recent developments were 
counterbalanced by a substantial increase in collective action with friends and colleagues. 
In places with more than ten workers, around fifty per cent had regular meetings between 
senior management and the workforce, briefing, or problem-solving groups. 
Table 5: Changes in Worker Voice Arrangements (%) 
 
Type of voice arrangement 1990 1999 
Union only 14 9 
Union and non-union 39 33 
Non-union only 28 40 
No voice 19 17 
Representative voice only 18 14 
Representative and direct voice 43 39 
Direct voice only 20 30 
No voice 19 17 
Weighted base 1,997 1,991 
Unweighted base 2,059 1,920 
 
Source: WIRS, 2000. 
      The strategy was not always evident. The equilibrium of supporting old unionists and 
recruiting new ones was often not well defined. And, up to now, equal opportunities and 
family friendly policies, had not been given great consideration. It was time-consuming 
for trade unionists to take measures concerning management especially in order to put 
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sector wide agreements right and reconcile themselves to the disintegration of collective 
bargaining. Special prominence attached to social partnership implies that those 
difficulties may have been overcome. 
      The likelihood of new places attaining a desired level of acceptance has decreased 
over the years, in comparison with old sites. Similarly, the probability of a junior 
employee becoming a trade unionist and participating in collective representation has 
also become smaller, in contrast with old employees. Which of those trends, is more 
significant in the interpretation of the decrease in membership? An authoritative 
explanation could be given if only we had the combined information on new places and 
workers. However, scholars reflect that the dominant trend is the one related to sites 
because all employees have a smaller chance of becoming trade unionists in places 
founded in the early eighties (Machin, 2000). This is quite possible, it is less probable for 
a labour institution to exist in new sites, which also decreases the likelihood of collective 
action for all workers. Junior employees are especially affected as they are more probable 
to work in new places. In sites founded in the early eighties, for instance, just ten per cent 
of workers were under twenty-five, while in places founded in the late eighties and early 
nineties they were seventeen per cent. 
      The British Household Panel Survey of union wage effects, is instructive. For trade 
unionists, the salary bonus has fallen from around sixteen per cent in the early nineties to 
about ten per cent in the late nineties. There is no pay premium to enlist in a labour 
institution, and no expenses incurred to quit. The argument is that for men it used to pay 
to be in a union and it used to pay to join a union, but by the end of the 1990s it does not. 
For women the answer is, it does still pay to be in a union, but not by as much as it used 
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to, and it does not pay to newly join. If labour institutions did not exist the spread in the 
wage distribution would be larger by 2.6% between men and women. This impact of 
unions on the wage structure is estimated from differences between union and non-union 
wages in the presence of unions. This evidence is then used to calculate what wages 
would be in the absence of unions. The implied assumptions and method of calculation is 
set out by experts (Charlwood et al. 2001). This is a significant outcome. It can be 
regarded in terms of relative importance if we compare it to the NMW effect. The new 
legislation in the late nineties was particularly advantageous for females, more than half 
of the employees affected were women, and the spread in the wage distribution was 
decreased by 1%. In comparison with the union effect, institutions reduce the gender 
differential by 2.6%, much more than the national minimum wage.   
      Besides, across public and private companies labour institutions can reduce the 
distribution of pay in unionized sites more than in non-unionized places. It was a long 
time ago that classical economists pioneered the general notion of the common rule in the 
field of workplace practices to describe the aspirations of labour institutions. The 
determination of a minimum wage policy, along with other related issues, was the basis 
of this idea. The legacy of this general notion has faded away as negotiation of wages by 
trade unionists in most cases has shifted from nationwide settlements to either industry or 
company pacts. Less than ten per cent of workers are now incorporated in nationwide 
treaties while twenty-five per cent are included in company arrangements. Accordingly 
the wage distribution in non-unionized sites is reasonably expected to be greater today 
than it was in years gone by. However, in unionized places the spread of pay will be less, 
ceteris paribus, than in non-unionized sites. Sector-wide agreements are present in 
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sections of publishing, weaving, furnishing and building. Furthermore, in industries 
where nationwide agreements were broken the policies of labour institutions allow for 
and promote equality of rates between firms via research and development for 
negotiations by an organized body of employees, a jointly operated mixture of several 
small holdings, and the participation of trade unionists in decision making. 
      There is another reason why wage dispersion is smaller between organized workers 
than between unorganized employees. It is because labour institutions safeguard the 
wages of those on small incomes and in organized places, they put into practice fair 
principles, such as work status for instance, instead of biased considerations, like in 
unorganized sites (Belfield, 2002; Metcalf, 2002). Labour institutions also cut down wage 
dispersion in distinct groups of the workforce, for example males or females, ethnic or 
other minorities, and non-manual or manual workers. If it wasn’t for labour institutions 
wage dispersion between men and women would be greater by almost three per cent. 
This is an important result. The introduction of equal opportunities in the past was 
particularly advantageous for the employment of females, most of them benefited from 
those policies, but wage distribution between women and men was reduced by just one 
per cent. The effect of labour institutions in decreasing wage dispersion between men and 
women is also stronger than that of family friendly policies. The recognition of a labour 
institution is strongly related to a possibility of the existence of policies such as 
workplace nursery and parental leave to facilitate the work of women. Other policies such 
as entitlements to job share are aimed at women, racial and ethnic minorities, and those 
with long-term disabilities. (Bewley and Fernie, 2003; Bewley, 2002). Females in 
organized places are more privileged with regard to selection procedures, versatile job 
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agreements and support for their own tasks and responsibilities than females in 
unorganized places.    
Chart 4: Extra Likelihood of Policy Being Found in Workplace with Recognition (%) 
 
 
 
Source: WIRS, 2000. 
      Equal opportunities and family friendly policies, are affiliated with collective 
representation. It may be, for instance, that organized places are more probable to adopt 
these courses of action because labour institutions are usually acknowledged in large 
sites, where the need for equal opportunities and work redistribution pacts is greater than 
in small places. Researchers who made an enquiry into this likelihood discovered that 
regardless of the nature of industry, the largeness of company, and the practice of human 
resource management, equal opportunities are related to union acceptance (Fernie and 
Gray, 2000). The data displays that the possibility of the adoption of those principles of 
action is greater in organized places. The acceptance of labour institutions is affiliated 
with the frequency of these approaches. For instance unorganized sites are about twenty 
per cent less probable to have a formal written policy on managing diversity. From 
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another perspective places with a labour institution are more probable to adopt those 
courses of action and in particular to collect statistics on posts held by women or men. 
      Besides, these average results can have very significant implications. When a 
resolution is reached to acknowledge a labour institution, management is particularly 
influenced by the methodology the partners intend to follow. Firstly, administration is 
regarded as more effective when there is equilibrium of control between managers and 
unionists on the shop floor. Too powerful or too fragile labour institutions may damage 
the social and economic environment. Secondly, when a labour institution is accepted it 
is recommended for managers to make provisions for it, acknowledgement combined 
with animosity is the worst policy. Thirdly, labour institutions are considered to be more 
efficient when management is successful. The directors’ awareness of the political, 
economic and social environment can also support the validity of these arguments for 
business administration. Labour institutions with delegates who have the ability to act as 
a support mechanism for employees, or an influential mediator for employers, are 
regarded as capable of creating a better socioeconomic environment. The important 
consequences are obvious. When an agreement is reached to accept a labour institution it 
is reasonable to provide for the members and make sure they are satisfied. This indicates, 
for instance, that social partnership which advances a collaborative employment 
relationship is likely to produce a more effective management. 
      Throughout the period since classical economists talked about work accidents, it has 
been confirmed that the existence of a labour institution on the shop floor is reasonably 
expected to increase safety. There is a variety of reasons which cause this effect. For 
instance, trade unionists take security measures and, from time to time may have to go on 
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strike regionally. Several labour institutions provide health services and educational 
facilities for members and their families. In addition, the existence of an officially 
acknowledged labour institution on the shop floor will presumably favour voice over exit, 
and trade unionists who are worried about injuries are more probable to be advised. 
      According to the school of pluralism, labour institutions have a significant sword of 
justice effect. It has been demonstrated, for instance, that labour institutions moderate 
wage distribution, and protect the right to be employed without discrimination. Special 
prominence attached to these principles may as well encourage several non-unionists to 
sign up with a labour institution and it is the revival of syndicalism an important issue we 
now have to address. 
      It is possible that, finally, the execution of the EU Directive on Information and 
Consultation will have a greater impact on British industrial relations than union 
voluntary recognitions. It validates, new methods and ideas, fixed and comprehensive 
settlements for communication and conference for every company using the services of 
more than fifty members of staff. It accounts for seventy-five per cent of workers in 
Britain. For some managers this may be an occasion to enfeeble collective representation, 
for others it might be a chance offered by circumstances to introduce long-term 
agreements which supplement high commitment administration. The challenge for labour 
institutions is to capitalize on those plans and to increase their influence on the shop 
floor. The facts verify that the existence of a labour institution in the workplace may 
complement those settlements. 
      How can British labour institutions use the ongoing developments to their own 
advantage? Generally there are a couple of distinct possibilities. The number of jobs in 
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organized sites has to increase more than in unorganized places or labour institutions will 
have to expand membership density. 
      Membership has fallen since the early nineties where labour institutions are accepted, 
have workers lost their appetite for unionism? The British Social Attitudes Survey 
attempts to answer this. It claims that the desire of an employee to sign up with a labour 
institution or not is contingent on that employee’s apprehension of the advantages and 
disadvantages of collective action as they are perceived by friends and colleagues (BSAS, 
2002). Some experts ascribe the decline of unionism in the nineties to the emergence of 
HRM, and the dissolution of collective bargaining for instance, which enfeebled 
unionization (Brown et al. 1998; Charlwood, 2000). Others suggest that collective 
representation has decreased because of the redundancies of experienced representatives 
and influential delegates who were not happy with the new style of governance 
(Fairbrother, 2000; Darlington, 1995). Scholars also contemplate that the weakening of 
unionization in the nineties is related to the servicing model where labour institutions 
offer perks to trade unionists like credit facilities, health centers and insurance policies 
(Edwards, 2000). As they observe, this model has not fared well. 
      Labour institutions will have to be skeptical about enforced or hurried recognitions. 
Commentators define a union as an organization of empowered employees (Metcalf, 
2001; Willman, 2001). A labour institution acknowledged via the legal route is, in my 
opinion, more probable to face a recalcitrant employer which is the case in around thirty 
per cent of unionized sites where there is no significant collective action. What is more, 
labour institutions are less likely to be economically sustainable, incurring more expenses 
to function than raising profits, therefore straining the resourcefulness of unionists. If that 
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is the case the fundamental reason for labour institutions’ support for the legal route must 
be interpreted by the indirect effect of the new legislation which assists the formation of 
voluntary recognition deals. 
      In a recent study it was displayed that marriages of convenience are heavily skewed 
toward the construction and building industry and trade unions are not concentrating on 
employment growth areas such as call centers, retail and business services and hotels and 
restaurants (Gall, 2000; Gall and McKay, 2000). This results from trade unions recruiting 
and organizing within relatively familiar areas and where they already have some 
membership base. This is validated by the Industrial Relations Services which 
demonstrates the particulars of union recognition agreements illustrated by employment 
trends between the late nineties and the turn of the century just before the new legislation 
comes into effect. More than two hundred voluntary recognition deals have been traced. 
Roughly half the employees were in the manufacturing and construction industry, 
electricity, gas and water services as well as catering staff. More than fifty thousand 
employees were in the traditional building, banking and insurance and 
telecommunication industries, and only around fifteen per cent of members of staff were 
in other services. 
Table 6: New Recognitions 
 
Sector No. of recognitions No. of employees 
Manufacturing and construction 78 28,699 
Public services 12 10,280 
Finance 5 10,600 
Transport 29 11,329 
Communication 48 23,839 
Ex-public sector 2 2,100 
Electricity, Gas, Water 16 12,938 
General eg LA Payroll Catering 1 50,000 
Total 212 149,756 
 
Source: IRS, 2000. 
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      The number of jobs is improbable to increase disproportionately among unionists 
than between free-riders. As a result the revitalization of labour institutions depends on 
the engagement in intense collective organization. Therefore labour institutions will have 
to rely on the shadow cast by the legal route, to generate a larger amount of official 
acknowledgements than recently. Moreover, even though recruitment of young 
employees is imperative, labour institutions have to attach special importance to 
membership decrease where they are accepted, if they can hold on to old workers and 
recruit about ten per cent of the young employees every year their fate will change 
thoroughly. 
 
Institutional Policies for Employee Involvement 
 
      There was an extraordinary and substantial weakening of unionization in England 
during the eighties and the nineties that, if it was to go on, would put in jeopardy the 
subsistence of labour institutions (Bryson and Gomez, 2002; Milward et al. 2000). An 
explanation of this degeneration may be that the urge of unionists for mobilization has 
decreased. But there is no evidence in Britain to confirm such a trend. Nevertheless, 
several commentators suggest that there is a tendency toward liberalization while union 
organizing which used to support labour institutions is on the downgrade (Bacon and 
Storey, 1996; Phelps, 1990). This, subsequently, can have an impact on union 
membership. The recent developments display that a change of position has taken place. 
      When labour institutions are familiar with the reasons why workers want to 
participate they can also do what it takes to sustain membership and representation. The 
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motive power for union recruitment is the general notion that you get better treatment if 
you have a problem at work. This concept is justified, because the influence and the 
authority of labour institutions as representatives of the workforce is related to the 
number of people taking part in union activity. This notion derives from evidence which 
illustrates that employee involvement is relevant to the possibility that many workers 
believe labour institutions make a difference to what it is like to work here, and to a union 
density income bonus (Bryson, 2003).  This is mentioned by approximately fifty per cent 
of unionists and demonstrates that labour institutions have a significant insurance policy 
part. About twenty-five per cent think the more people that join a trade union the more 
effective it is. A prime motive for employees to become involved is because friends and 
colleagues were already members. 
Chart 5: Reasons for Joining among Members in Unionized Workplaces 
 
 
 
Source: BWRPS, 2001. 
      One of the advantages of unionization is the respectability of good social standing 
workers enjoy, inasmuch as there is a feeling of mutual support and acceptance on the 
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shop floor when they associate themselves with a labour institution (Booth, 1985; Bryson 
2003). Moreover, if partners and work mates belong to a society, they are potentially 
capable of providing insight about the advantages of unionization which may not be 
easily recognized (Bryson and Gomez, 2003). Some employees quoted the union offered 
financial services such as insurance and credit cards. A small proportion stated they had 
different objectives, and a weak minority could not state why they decided to join a 
labour institution. Whether labour institutions can hold on to a high membership is 
contingent on whether they are considered as value for money. Roughly half the 
employees claim unionization is reasonable value. Over a quarter judges it is good value, 
but a smaller percentage reckons it is poor value. We must take notice of other issues 
which are not related to notions of value for money. They incorporate concepts of the 
political environment and how managers and workers get on with each other, if the 
unionists have difficulties in the workplace, or are content about decision making in 
relation to their tasks and responsibilities. It appears that labour institutions are perceived 
as good value for money by members when there is a cooperative attitude and efficient 
voice mechanisms. 
      Employees in organized places have a strong desire for collective action, they prefer 
to deal with problems through a union rather than by themselves, with regard to a number 
of issues. There is an inclination by most workers for collective representation in respect 
of topics like sexual discrimination and harassment. To the contrary, the desire for 
independence is stronger than the inclination for collective action with reference to issues 
such as skill development. The desire for representation in negotiating working hours and 
conditions is the same whether it is through a union or not. These issues are very 
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important. They display that the inclination for collective action is greater when 
employees deal with job security. In relation to training and other topics, although 
workers have a desire for collective representation, they also have an inclination for non-
union action. If labour institutions want to increase union density, they will have to deal 
with these issues. It comes as no surprise that, even though employees attach great 
importance to the negotiating part of labour institutions as much as to their insurance 
part, it is the notion of collective representation, instead of union negotiating, which is 
more attractive. 
      Execution of the European Union regulations on advising and counseling workers, 
once it is accomplished, will have as a consequence the extensive utilization of WCs in 
the United Kingdom (Gospel and Wilman, 2003). To address the issue of whether WCs 
are expected to jeopardize the demand for collective action by employees we have to 
draw attention to the facts which demonstrate that in reality the existence of WCs 
strengthened the preference of workers for collective voice, and display that it enhanced 
collective action. The British Worker Representation and Participation Survey provides 
for the data. It demonstrates that, when employees are asked about the kind of 
representation they prefer, around ninety per cent of workers say it is through a union. 
Eighty per cent opted for unions and councils, and five per cent cited works council on its 
own (BWRPS, 2001). This evidence is very revealing, as regards the interests of 
employees, for it becomes clear that WCs are not a real threat for labour institutions. 
      The following chart displays that organizational inefficiency was critical for 
membership decline, about forty per cent of workers said the general notion that the 
union doesn’t achieve anything was significant in making up their mind not to enlist. 
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Furthermore, despite the perceived advantages for unionization, thirty-five per cent of 
employees were willing to free-ride, and they thought they would be better off if they did 
not have to pay fees. A suggestion for labour institutions to overpower these difficulties 
is to concentrate on providing services which are exclusive to unionists. The percentage 
of workers who are free-riders may have to reconsider the perception that membership 
fees are too high, this way in-fill recruitment is likely to rise. 
Chart 6: Factors in Non-Members Decisions not to Join Union (%) 
 
 
 
Source: BWRPS, 2001. 
      Undoubtedly the most significant determinant affecting employees’ judgement to sign 
up with a labour institution is the recognition of its efficiency. When workers are 
convinced that the office or the factory would be less functional without unionization, 
they are around forty per cent more probable to enlist in a labour institution. Another 
concept is that labour institutions are essential to safeguard fair wages and treatment 
which is also closely related to a great possibility of mobilization. Employees’ awareness 
of organizational functions is also significant, inasmuch as workers are reasonably 
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expected to enrol in a labour institution when they consider it as credible and capable of 
making a difference. Employees’ attempts to increase union density will be more 
vigorous when they deal with issues such as sexual discrimination and harassment. When 
workers think they have no such difficulties are about twenty per cent less likely to sign 
up with a labour institution. When union members are efficient at delivering and well 
organized, employees are more probable to become involved. Thirty per cent of workers 
believe it is too expensive for them to become members of a union. This notion seems to 
be the only reason for non-members not to join a labour institution specified in the 
questionnaire, which does not depend on something else for its validity. 
      The data in table 8 clarifies a very important concept. It demonstrates that around 
twenty-five per cent of employees renounce all forms of unionization in every case 
identified in the survey, but just two per cent of workers refuse to accept the assistance of 
other fellow officials in all issues. This illustrates that there is a small number of 
employees who are not receptive to organization, undeterred by the existence of a labour 
institution in the business. From another perspective, about forty per cent of workers 
prefer collective voice in most cases, illustrating the urge for mobilization by a sizable 
percentage of employees. 
Table 7: Number of Issues where Non-Members Desire Collective Voice 
 
 
 
(%) Union or on own (%) Colleagues or on own 
Sexual / racial discrimination 
 
10 5 
Negotiating salary 
 
10 14 
Negotiating working hours and 
conditions 
17 26 
Promotion issues 
 
14 18 
Bullying at the workplace 
 
9 11 
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Training and skill development 
 
16 24 
 
Source: BWRPS, 2001. 
      Though the British Worker Representation and Participation Survey demonstrates 
WCs have no impact on the demand for collective action, the Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey displays the prevalence of WCs over labour institutions. More 
astonishing is the result that around twenty per cent of workers were unresponsive to 
labour institutions and works councils, which is possibly an illustration of the barriers to 
mobilization in organized places (WERS, 2004). 
      Although the difficulties of collective representation are evident the helpful 
circumstances are not as obvious, therefore one may anticipate the urge for mobilization 
to be stronger between employees in unionized places than it is between workers in non-
unionized places. This is not in agreement with the British Worker Representation and 
Participation Survey. Around fifteen per cent state it is very likely they will enlist if a 
labour institution is founded, and about thirty per cent state it is quite likely. 
Chart 7: Likelihood of Non-Members in Non-Union Workplaces Joining a Union 
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Source: BWRPS, 2001. 
      Workers in non-unionized places can get insight about the advantages of organizing 
from friends and colleagues who are more experienced. Employees strongly agree strong 
unions are needed to protect employee working conditions and wages and former 
unionists are more probable to sign up with a new labour institution, the possibility is by 
five per cent greater as very likely and by seven per sent as quite likely. These results also 
demonstrate that the understanding of the employment relationship in an unorganized 
workplace does not substantially decrease the urge for mobilization. 
      The proposition which comes to light is that, even though the desire for collective 
action may be slightly weaker among former unionists and other workers in non-
unionized places, a relatively large segment of employees has an inclination for collective 
representation on all matters. This argument is endorsed in the British Worker 
Representation and Participation Survey which displays that non-members desire union 
voice. Though around forty per cent of workers have no urge for mobilization, about 
twenty five per cent have a preference for collective action on most topics. Roughly half 
the employees have a desire for the kind of collective representation with colleagues on 
most of these topics. Therefore, even though the inclination for collective action is lesser 
for workers in unorganized places than it is for other workers in organized places, the 
need is stronger for a substantial amount of non-unionists, and may become even stronger 
if labour institutions can realize the potential and the urge for mobilization. 
      This comparative analysis points out that about one quarter of unorganized workers 
have a desire for collective representation. Thus, the future of trade unions in modern 
Britain is promising, as it is the concept that labour institutions are necessary for 
collective action, and the notion that they are not outdated organizations. Employees 
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strongly disagree unions are old-fashioned or have no future in modern Britain. From 
another perspective, when they are satisfied with the authority they have on decision 
making in relation to their tasks, they are not reasonably expected to be engaged in trade 
unionism. 
      When a labour institution is not present, the urge for mobilization between workers in 
non-unionized places stems from their awareness of unionization and social and 
economic issues, their comprehension of collective representation, and the prospects of 
collective action in the presence of recognized trade unionism. Consequently, to increase 
their influence in non-unionized places labour institutions have to specify what members 
of staff think about these issues, and with consultation, try to convince them of the 
benefits of mobilization. This empirical study makes the following suggestions. Labour 
institutions should focus on unorganized employees, because they have a greater need for 
unionization than others. Non-unionized workers are more responsive to collective 
representation when they perceive their association to the manager as one that cannot be 
settled by mutual concession, and there is a shortage of effective voice mechanisms. 
Trade unionists have to establish what measures they can take which are not made 
available by Human Resource Management for this is related with a decrease in the urge 
for mobilization. Though they are not a real threat for collective representation, WCs are 
more appealing than labour institutions between non-unionized employees. Trade 
unionists must also take into account unconventional modes of operation and collective 
action as a way of strengthening the desire for unionization. Lastly, the urge for 
mobilization will be contingent on a membership increase, to secure a good position in a 
non-unionized place. 
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The Managerial Discourse of Empowerment 
 
      In a standard piece of literature, The Changing System of Industrial Relations in 
Great Britain, scholars have maintained confidently that the truth of the matter is that the 
study of managers in industrial relations is in a primitive state (Clegg, 1979). A large 
progress has been made since those days, and as other commentators suggested more 
recently, the diffusion of knowledge is widespread on executive trends in workplace 
relationships, on the part of managers in the development of organized negotiations, and 
on unionization (Sisson, 1987). More than anything else, in the last ten years or so, with 
the major advance of organizational studies, the systematic investigation of employment 
relationships, is reasonably expected to incorporate the part of managers, as that of the 
government or labour institutions (Guest, 2001). 
      Having said that, government interference in workplace relationships not only 
implicates statutory legislation, but also affects the formation of the prevailing standards 
(Godard, 2002; Poole et al. 2005). A matter to be discussed is to what a degree the 
emergence of the liberal doctrine has influenced the behaviour of executives with regard 
to state control and in favour of the entrepreneurial ideology? In conjunction with the 
disintegration of neo-corporatism, manager resistance to discretionary fiscal policy has 
escalated. Executive approval for legal restraints on labour institutions authority has 
decreased. Manager assistance for parliamentary mediation to promote an entrepreneurial 
philosophy founded on privatizations and commerce has accelerated, but probably 
moderated by the advent of business ethics. 
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      This radical shift in Britain’s employment relationships has brought about a 
discussion on the hollow shell theory, according to which, when labour institutions and 
organized negotiations are existent, there is a greater executive effect on workplace 
relationships (Hyman, 1997). Furthermore, authority associations can significantly 
moderate the impact of cultural changes affiliated with reformative political decisions 
and the operational modes that originate from them (Kelly, 2004). A problem requiring 
an answer is whether the decrease in the influence of labour institutions has been relevant 
to adjustments in the attitudes of managers and their organizational behaviour in 
employment relationships over the last ten years or so. Britain’s executives are extremely 
concerned of the diminution in labour institutions’ authority. Management is less hostile 
to labour institutions since the turn of the century. Considering the decrease in union 
density in Britain, executive participation in labour institutions and personnel 
organizations may have subsided. 
      In Britain, usually, the most significant organizations for workplace relationships 
associate with organized negotiations. Nevertheless, in recent times, organized 
negotiations in Britain have gone down. Therefore, in agreement with a recent survey, in 
sites with officially acknowledged labour institutions, organized negotiations decreased 
from eighty-six percent in the eighties to sixty-seven percent in the nineties (WERS, 
2004). Nonetheless, collective representation with colleagues seems to have been on the 
increase, for instance scheduled appointments for chief executives and members of staff, 
and quality circles (Poole et al. 2005). All the same, the sharing of profits, subsequent to 
a substantial growth in the eighties, persisted as unchanged during the nineties, and 
worker stockholding slightly decreased in the same period (Millward et al. 2000). These 
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circumstances draw attention to another matter that has to be decided. To what a degree 
are current trends in the management of employment relationships continuous? 
Organizational operations have influenced the attitudes of executives in workplace 
relationships and this becomes manifest in the modes of organized negotiations and 
worker participation. 
      A postal questionnaire of Britain’s chief executives is sampled every ten years by the 
Chartered Management Institute, to analyze the opinions of managers on industrial 
relationships. We observe supporting facts of the connection between macroeconomic 
and social trajectories during the eighties and the nineties as concerns executive 
organizational behaviour, the influence of worker empowerment on human resource 
management and the lag effect of trade unions. The most astonishing results are the 
augmentation of manager unionization since the turn of the century and proof of the 
substitution of organized negotiations by company level agreements and the late increase 
in worker shareholding. 
      A point of special prominence for the employment relationships in the seventies was 
the utilization of discretionary fiscal policy by the parliament in an effort to control 
inflation. According to available data, managers have resisted this strategy. Nevertheless, 
between the eighties and the nineties Britain’s executives became more favourably 
inclined to such a strategy, although the discrepancies are not important. This is in spite 
of the fact that a general increase in prices was not as significant for the economy because 
the purchasing value of money was regulated by the Monetary Policy Committee. 
Therefore our earlier proposition is partially endorsed. There was a substantial escalation 
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of resistance to discretionary fiscal policy in the eighties constant to a growing versatility 
in workplace relationships, but this did not accelerate in the nineties. 
Table 8: Attitudes to Government Intervention in Industrial Relations and in Industry (%) 
 
Government 
should 
Strongly agree Agree Indifferent Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Control wages 
and salaries 
1.2 12.6 9.7 40.1 36.0 
Control prices 
 
3.1 14.3 11.4 40.1 31.1 
Legislate about 
strikes 
12.9 45.0 15.3 16.9 9.9 
Have arbitration 
 
12.0 48.0 21.9 12.8 5.2 
Establish 
tribunals 
10.1 46.2 24.3 12.7 6.6 
Encourage 
entrepreneurship 
48.1 45.3 3.8 1.8 1.1 
Reduce powers 
over industry 
22.7 40.3 17.3 16.2 3.6 
Encourage share 
ownership 
28.5 50.8 17.1 2.6 1.0 
Reduce 
monopolies 
30.0 52.2 12.5 4.3 1.0 
Have enterprise 
culture 
42.9 47.4 7.5 1.7 0.5 
 
Source: CMI, 2000. 
      During the last twenty years, chief executives have been uncertain about the role of 
labour institutions. They naturally support a singular system of power instead of a plural 
and heterogeneous network, in which labour institutions participate in decision making 
(Poole and Mansfield, 1993). However, several executives enlisted in labour institutions 
or personnel organizations since the eighties, as confirmed by other studies. One of the 
reasons is that labour institutions have evolved into the principal agents for bargaining 
wages and working hours, at least in state owned enterprises. In fact, in the questionnaire 
by the Chartered Management Institute executives responded to whether a labour 
institution or personnel organization was present and they were favourably disposed to 
joining one of them.   
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Table 9: Trade Unions, Managers’ Attitudes (%) 
 
The trade 
unions 
Strongly agree Agree Indifferent Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Have more 
power 
0.9 10.5 19.8 59.2 10.3 
Have too much 
power 
2.7 14.3 30.3 47.1 5.1 
Have economic 
interests 
4.9 31.0 30.4 29.3 4.4 
Should be 
voluntary 
34.8 54.2 6.6 3.5 1.0 
Be concerned 
solely with pay 
4.1 24.3 13.3 51.4 6.4 
Be prepared to 
use action 
2.2 15.5 12.3 48.1 21.9 
 
Source: CMI, 2000. 
      Our proposition gives attention to the measurement of the incorporation of 
management in trade unions. On the one hand, there seems to have been a switch since 
the eighties from collective bargaining to alternative ways of representation with 
colleagues (Millward et al. 2000). To the degree that this has happened, on the other hand 
the trends in human resource development may have shifted from joint action to 
individual representation but the range of activity may not have changed significantly. 
Nevertheless, in agreement with facts and figures, even though it is evident that collective 
bargaining has, for the most part, substantially decreased, it is uncertain that there has 
been a comparable rise in other methods of employee involvement. It must be stated that 
our evidence is not the most appropriate for the evaluation of such developments. 
Nonetheless, in the postal questionnaire executives responded to what a degree they were 
engaged in scheduled appointments for managers and workers and they were favourably 
inclined to the participation of councillors or unionists in executive commissions. 
      Labour institutions are enfeebled these days, but management is more supportive. 
Besides, according to the results of this study, it was in the eighties and not in the nineties 
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that the decrease in the authority of labour institutions seems to have happened. It was 
also in the eighties that executive participation in labour institutions declined 
significantly. In comparison, more important adjustments in Britain’s employment 
relationships seem to have occurred in the nineties. We have interpreted this by the lag 
effect of trade unions, which means, that due to the path-dependency of organizational 
networks, it is time-consuming for the workplace relationships to adjust to 
macroeconomic policies as well as to trajectories of employee empowerment. 
Nevertheless, though in agreement with the events of the eighties we argued that the 
socioeconomic environment had restrained the diminution of organized negotiations, this 
does not seem to have continued in the nineties. Our evidence is in accordance with the 
hollow shell theory of a significant decrease in effective organized negotiations as 
confirmed by a recent survey (WERS, 2004). This confirms the argument that trade 
unions can postpone, but can not eliminate, the impact of corporate governance, at least 
for a prolonged period, and also supports the theory that organizational reform can 
originate from a gradual evolution as well as a radical shift.                  
 
Welfare Capitalism in Mutual Gains Enterprises 
 
      The spread of corporate governance that relates to a short period of time is 
commonplace in America and Britain but the line of reasoning is that even though the 
two countries can be described as neo-liberal societies, there are substantial discrepancies 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). For instance, although in both cases, economic policies of 
competition like the utilization of stocks are imperative in the creation and sustenance of 
jobs and work redistribution, in the American Business System versatile modes of 
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operation are integrated into a coordinated structure. As opposed to this, in Britain, 
competition and versatility are more broadly described and associate with liberalization 
of the economic system, the deregulation of industrial relations and in that respect the 
generation of new jobs. The concept of parallel tendencies defines the likeness of the two 
models of corporate governance, but additionally confirms the irregularities and 
discrepancies. Following on from this, organizations established in the continental stake 
holding tradition where versatile modes of operation embrace not only economic 
objectives but corporate governance which relates to a long period of time as well as 
versatility and modernization have to contend with these irregularities. Nevertheless, 
when there is state intervention in contrast to state abstention, the impact of corporate 
governance that relates to a short period of time may be regulated by the social partners 
more effectively than in America or Britain (Barnard et al. 2003). I will analyze this topic 
in more detail in the next chapter when I make an analogy of the interpretations and 
results I describe here with the ongoing developments in the workplace model of France. 
      The importance of the range of foreign direct investment and expansion of US 
multinational corporations is a research priority for many reasons. The effect of foreign 
direct investment on industrial relations and trade unions was demonstrated in Servain-
Schreiber’s work, in which American multinational corporations were considered as 
capable of exercising influence on the values and practices in other countries (Edwards 
and Ferner, 2002). When this book was written, plenty of thought was given by scholars 
in the area of trade unionism concerning the capacity of US multinational corporations to 
exert influence on organizations and traditions. Shearer, for instance, discovered that 
American multinational corporations were unwilling to officially acknowledge labour 
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institutions, practiced a more independent type of corporate governance and were less 
hesitant to suspend employees than nationally controlled companies (ibid. 2002). The 
notion that foreign direct investment exercises influence on industrial relations has 
become widely accepted. 
      The coordinated structure of US multinational corporations sustained by company 
pacts and industrial agreements, has traditionally functioned in an independent 
environment which advances a powerful non-union attitude between managers. 
Nevertheless, the American Business System has been defined by a variable modus 
operandi of New Deal directors or nonconformist managers that fluctuates from refined 
welfare capitalist organizations which provide workers with human resource and 
employee involvement to companies that pursue low-road strategies. Mutual gains 
enterprises correspond to a highly developed and complex variant of non-union 
companies which promote fairness and equity and are defined by a rational attitude as 
well as the conviction that the enterprise, instead of the government or labour institutions 
must make provisions for the well-being of employees (Almond and Clark, 2004). 
Consequently, as a substitute for labour institutions, big companies initiate human 
resource management plans in the field of social security, health services and 
employment protection. Accordingly, they originated productivity bonuses, fringe 
benefits and cooperation (Jacoby, 1997). They also increased workforce participation 
through the development of a distinct and comprehensive savoir vivre, the research of 
society and relationships and voice mechanisms for the consultation of members of staff. 
In any case, where appropriate they are willing to play it tough to suppress a rebellion. In 
comparison, New Deal directors allow for the official acknowledgment of labour 
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institutions and negotiate in good faith with unionists on statutory provisions and 
centralized arrangements, i.e. job control unionism, which provides for quality circles and 
other standardized operations. In many aspects, the good fortune of the two variants is 
dependent on the stability of trade relations and the non-existence of recessions. In late 
years, the prosperity of mutual gains enterprises has been moderated by the increased use 
of mechanical arts and applied sciences and New Deal managers have encountered a 
highly competitive global environment that has impaired sector-level agreements, making 
less clear the differentiation between the two models of corporate governance. According 
to some commentators this situation may force management to resist unionization so as to 
survive in an economic environment of intense competition leading to the disintegration 
of the employment relationship (Darbishire and Katz, 2000). Nevertheless, the heritage of 
mutual gains and the New Deal persists in company-level industrial relations. There is an 
established practice of coordination for workers and organizational capabilities for 
managers which may join forces with the home-country environment to support 
company-level agreements and industrial relations. It is the manifestation of these 
attributes that may restrain the effect of current workplace practices which on first 
impression cast doubt upon mutual gains and the New Deal. 
      The extent to which it is possible for multinational corporations to spread their culture 
is not decided only by these restraints, nevertheless, but also by the receptiveness of the 
host country environment. Some techniques are contingent on employees obtaining a 
wide range of qualifications, and on a strong industrial relations system, or else, the 
corporate culture will not spread in the same manner it does in the country of origin. 
Thus, when social partners are not capable of implementing innovative policies, and the 
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workplace relations structure does not have the capacity to support them, the network is 
not receptive. For example, scholars have suggested that the British model, with its 
characteristics of somewhat confined skill learning, formalized performance of tasks and 
reliance on a small number of key experts, is not as quick to receive ideas for incremental 
adjustments as the German variant, because this depends more on diversified quality 
production, work redistribution pacts, and a broader range of potential receptors 
(Edwards and Ferner, 2002; Lam, 1997). For that reason, liberal societies, like Britain, 
are not usually as responsive or sensitive to organizational change as the more 
coordinated economies. 
      Most of the mutual gains enterprises have traditionally opposed unionism in Britain, 
though one or two finally recognized trade unions after a long period of dispute during 
the sixties and the seventies. In some partly unionized firms, a quite similar pattern of 
resistance to labour institutions, when this is possible, is also evident. On the other hand, 
the New Deal companies which are established in Britain have customarily conformed to 
the Oxford school of pluralism. It is perhaps too early to talk about the newly founded 
British subsidiaries. When industrial relations are organized to a limited extent or 
unorganized, this illustrates the business ethics transferred from the mother company, 
which may be associated with a regulated methodology aiming to slim the possibility of 
mobilization. The case of IT Services is informative. Throughout the seventies and the 
eighties, labour institutions exerted pressure to enlist unionists and were successful in the 
conclusion of a shotgun marriage via the legal route. The management opposed union 
acceptance, emphasizing the firm’s paternalistic methods, one of the directors engaged in 
negotiations for a settlement stated that he convinced the workers that you are joining IT 
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Services, it will look after you from cradle to grave (Almond and Clarke, 2004). This 
approach succeeded, inasmuch as most of the directors were unaffected by the 
acknowledgement. A chief executive who had been included in negotiations for an 
agreement spoke of the halo effect that they had experienced for a while after this 
wonderful achievement for the company (ibid. 2004) 
      Possibly the most important outcome of a literature review on American 
multinational corporations is that they are greatly concentrated, which makes them 
distinct from other firms (Edwards and Ferner, 2002). This effect is constant over the 
years and not relating to a particular time. In a questionnaire, about buy-outs of 
companies in Britain by multinational corporations it was discovered that the American 
mode of post-acquisition management appears to be hands-on, forceful, oriented to quick 
results, and distinctive (Child et al. 2000). The data on British subsidiaries, drawing from 
publications and relevant questionnaires display that this highly centralized structure is 
evident in the field of human resource and industrial relations (Beaumont and Martin, 
1999). Other evidence from France, Germany, Belgium and Holland implies that this 
greatly concentrated framework is inherent in US multinational corporations and is not 
related particularly to firms in Britain (Gunnigle, 1995). This highly centralized structure 
is exercised by means of leadership, for instance the extensive utilization of expatriates in 
managerial posts and by way of rules and regulations. US multinational corporations are 
identified by their dependence on strict economic control procedures, a recent project on 
companies in Europe, for example, disclosed their special attachment to regular economic 
audits (Wever, 1995). The significance of this greatly concentrated framework is the clear 
manifestation of the country of origin influence in US multinational corporations. 
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      Some commentators attach special prominence to the late policies about dividend 
yields and the effect they have on how US companies take well thought out decisions 
with the purpose of sustaining inherent characteristics of high competition, even though 
this trend is not essentially something new in Britain (O’Sullivan, 2000). Other scholars 
suggest, it is possible there is some inconsistency in the appraisal of corporate 
governance that relates to a short period of time because this was already implanted in 
British firms (Almond and Clarke, 2004; Thompson, 2003). The organizational 
capabilities of American companies indicate a tendency for inventiveness and creativity 
stimulated by the wide-ranging dissemination of workplace procedures and techniques 
pioneered by multinational corporations. Most importantly for our enquiry into the issue 
of originality and novelty of the American Business System, one of our major arguments 
in this part, the Americanness of British subsidiaries of US MNCs, is that multinational 
corporations are inventive and creative in the field of human resource as well as 
workplace performance in most cases, which has great consequences for the employment 
relationship. Although this hypothesis at first sight seems to be substantial with regard to 
the manifestation of dividend yields, and the determination of corporate management, it 
leaves a margin of doubt. What I imply, is that company-level settlements sustain the 
heritage of mutual gains enterprises, and New Deal methods in workplace relations, 
incorporating the legacy of the school of pluralism in the employment relationship, which 
becomes manifest in companies in Britain. 
      Another important point is how American multinational corporations coordinate with 
industrial relations systems in Europe and how employee delegates become responsive, 
that is to say, how the country of origin influence is moderated by the home-country 
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environment. I have argued that American multinational corporations have not complied 
with the customs of trade unions in Britain, but this is mitigated by the urgency to adjust 
to the local system of industrial relations. There are a small number of projects, 
nevertheless, that analyze the same company in various countries (Royle, 2000). There is 
virtually no knowledge on how an individual firm-level strategy is carried out and 
becomes functional in coordinated societies like France or Germany in contrast with 
liberal economies like Britain. A suggestion for further research, is how the union-free 
attitude of several American multinational corporations is received in a home-country 
network which makes constitutional provisions for unionization? An answer to this 
question is that in more integrated structures American multinational corporations with a 
union-free philosophy are probable to work out functional equivalents of unionization 
like employee involvement. 
      The distinctive characteristics of the American Business System are the operational 
coordination and the tendency for centralization of the corporate governance and the 
employment relationship spread out by the adoption of innovative approaches of human 
resource like those found in some British subsidiaries. In multinational corporations, the 
plants attempt to diffuse the workplace practices of the mother company to the daughterly 
firms, which subsequently become trail-blazers for the local companies. Nevertheless, the 
facts indicate that the situation is more complex than this for British firms. This is so for 
the reason that companies in Britain, although they demonstrate American qualities, are 
associated with a broader firm-level personnel management that also includes home-
country properties in traditionally non-union organizations. With reference to the current 
demands of the American Business System, company-level agreements are maintained 
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partly by the heritage of mutual gains techniques or New Deal methods in corporate 
governance. This gives rise to our main argument that the home-country environment and 
the manifestation of mutual gains practices and New Deal approaches can act as restraints 
on the workplace practices conveyed from the American Business System to Britain. 
      The range of activities performed by US multinational corporations has become 
wider. Under the circumstances of an economic environment which has been more 
advantageous since the eighties, American companies were reinforced in the world stock 
exchanges following an era during which organizations from Europe and Japan were 
thought to be more efficient than US companies. Taking into consideration the increasing 
globalization of labour markets, the effect of American multinational corporations on 
British industrial relations may reasonably be expected to grow. 
 
A European Perspective of Worker Participation 
 
      After discussing the American influence on British industrial relations and trade 
unions it becomes appropriate to also discuss the European influence. It may be argued 
that the European effect on British workplace relations and labour institutions is more 
important as it also involves statutory legislation. The commentary proceeds as follows. 
Firstly, I refer to the evolution of trade unions in Britain, by analyzing the historical 
background, and the argument is there have been several missed opportunities in the past. 
Secondly, the concluding part of this chapter analyzes from a European perspective the 
present context of representation, information, and consultation at work, with reference to 
British employees. I also try to answer the question what do British workers want, by 
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making international comparisons between the United Kingdom, and nations such as the 
United States, Germany, and, France. 
      By using a historical approach we can draw a number of arguments. Firstly, the 
inconsistency of the voluntary practice of free collective bargaining was that it was 
dependent on an essential supporting structure of legislation and government 
intervention. It could not provide a ceiling on the ambitions of trade unions, in 
advantageous circumstances, or a floor in disadvantageous circumstances. Secondly, 
according to some scholars, organized negotiations and informing and consulting 
developed simultaneously in an interdependent and complicated double helix relation 
(Wedderburn, 1997). Some times they supplemented one another, and some times they 
were against each other. Retrospectively, labour institutions and managers missed quite a 
few opportunities to establish an organizational framework of worker participation 
founded upon interrelated organized negotiations and advising and counseling. As far as 
British trade unions are concerned, in the mid seventies, they did not take a good chance 
to secure their legitimacy. Since the mid seventies, the organizational structure of the 
voluntary practice of collective bargaining dissolved, and the level of organized 
negotiations decreased. 
      When the Labour Party came to power in the late nineties the legislation on union 
recognition was reintroduced and the laws originating from the European Constitution on 
informing and consulting also had to be reformed. In the field of advising and counseling, 
the selection of delegates is based on a hierarchical order with shop stewards coming 
before the reps of informing and consulting commissions and the employees selected ad 
hoc for a particular task. As far as multinational corporations are concerned, the state 
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accepted the European Works Council Directive. This had the following implications. 
Firstly, it formed legally based representation agreements in Britain, though for a small 
number of workers, those in multinational corporations. Secondly, it regarded 
consultation as inclusive instead of exclusive, and the selection of employee delegates 
was institutionalized for organized workers as well as unorganized workers. Eventually, 
since the turn of the century, the British state also adopted the EU Directive on 
Information and Consultation Rights. Therefore, with regard to the legislation and its 
implementation, Britain has followed a multiple channels path, but has been left with a 
disintegrated organizational framework of advising and counseling (Gospel et al. 2003). 
      The existence of informing and consulting commissions and union recognition are 
strongly related. Accordingly, about forty percent of sites with an officially 
acknowledged labour institution had an advising and counseling commission, in 
comparison with less than twenty percent without one. Based on this piece of evidence 
some scholars suggest that union representation and indirect employee participation go 
hand in hand rather than being substitutes (Cully et al. 1999). Nevertheless, they conclude 
that in unorganized places with a labour institution, informing and consulting agreements 
do not seem to be a platform for acknowledgement (ibid. 1999). 
      If we now compare the United States with the United Kingdom we observe a 
common inheritance of a strong dependence on organized negotiations. In retrospect, 
American labour institutions were seeking to reach agreement with managers via 
collective bargaining. From another perspective, a number of big companies formed 
employer dominated labour institutions and non union arrangements (Gospel and 
Willman, 2003; Jakoby 1985). With the New Deal, the Wagner Act prohibited these 
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agreements, and, up to now advising and counseling with no labour institutions remains 
illegal. As a consequence, managers are restrained in representation and consultation 
processes with no trade unions. Labour institutions were seeking to negotiate and have 
not pressed for voluntaristic informing and consulting procedures. The result is that the 
level of organized negotiations has decreased, employee involvement has not increased, 
but advising and counseling committees have become more popular. 
      Germany has been compared several times with the United Kingdom by doctoral 
researchers of industrial relations. As opposed to Britain, Germany has traditionally 
followed a multiple channels path, with organized negotiations at the central level, legally 
based informing and consulting on the shopfloor, and worker participation in the 
executive committees. The academic literature of advising and counseling in Germany 
indicates that the relations between German labour institutions and works councils have 
been successful (Gospel and Willman, 2002). Trade unionists are often works councillors 
themselves, the labour institutions support their advisory role, and this is also beneficial 
for worker participation. In terms of legislation and its implementation German workers 
via the works councils are better informed and consulted than British workers. 
Nevertheless, more recently, works councils have in several occasions substituted for 
labour institutions, with a higher level of informing and consulting and a lower level of 
collective bargaining. For labour institutions this is both a challenge and an opportunity 
for further development of coordination (Frick and Lehmann, 2001; Thelen, 1991; 
Turner, 1991). 
      In practice, nevertheless, German labour institutions still have an important part in the 
procession of corporate information. Firstly, they have a significant role via the 
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consultative committee, and about eighty percent of works councillors are also trade 
unionists (Jakobi et al. 1992). Furthermore, at the request of trade unionists, the labour 
institution is eligible to become involved in work council and Economic Committee 
conferences. The labour institutions also provide advising and counseling to Betriebsrat 
members. Secondly, German labour institutions have a significant part through the 
executive committee, because of the presence of many works councillors (Gospel and 
Willman, 2004). Furthermore, full time trade unionists can participate in the supervisory 
board to represent the workers, and this makes accessible to them corporate information, 
and useful databases.      
      In comparison, the French case may be considered as less positive for labour 
institutions. France has also followed the path of multiple channels, with legally based 
advising and counseling and organized negotiations. Occasionally, the French state has 
interfered in workplace relationships to endorse agreements. In postwar years, legislation 
has made compulsory the presence of a comité d’entreprise. The introduction of the 
Auroux Law in the early eighties, has facilitated the role of the comité d’enterprise to 
secure the rights of representation and consultation as well as to guarantee worker 
participation in the decision making process. French managers are constitutionally 
obliged to advise and counsel employees on a large number of issues (Gospel and 
Willman, 2003). 
      Apart from the statutory legislation about management, in the field of redundancies, 
the French state has intervened several times to protect the workers. Between the mid 
seventies and the mid eighties adjustments were made to the Code du Travail and 
informing and consulting about redundancies (Howell, 1992; Jenkins, 2000). Between the 
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late eighties and the early nineties the law made it compulsory for companies to have a 
Plan Social. This certificate has to report the number of employees to be made redundant, 
the amount of compensation, vocational learning, and other information. If the comité 
d’entreprise decides that the provision of evidence in the Plan Social is not adequate, it 
can request a tribunal to cancel the process of redundancies and demand another plan. In 
several occasions related to big companies like Crédit du Nord, IBM France, La 
Samaritaine, and Michelin, the law has been interpreted in favour of the workers and the 
dismissals were halted (Gospel and Willman, 2004; Bledniak, 1999). 
      Industrial relations systems are strongly related to national trajectories and are not 
easy to emulate. Note that all the countries compared have a higher level of productivity 
than Britain. Market services make up 34-43% of total employment in the four countries, 
for productivity in market services as a whole, the US led the UK by 38% in the nineties, 
Germany led the UK by 34% and France led the UK by 36%, the UK productivity 
shortfall vis-à-vis Germany and France was wider in market services than in 
manufacturing, it is only relative to the US that Britain performs better in market services 
than in manufacturing (O’Mahoney et al. 1999). The argument is there are probably 
lessons to be learned for British workplace relations from the European countries. If 
British unionism conforms to the American model, it will be isolated in the shrinking 
area of organized negotiations. From a different perspective, there is a possibility that 
they can benefit from works councils style agreements, as in Germany. Nevertheless, the 
French story indicates there is no guaranteed route to success if they are not able to profit 
from these agreements. Speaking of Germany and France, the point is whether 
continental type representation and consultation may be successfully conveyed to Britain. 
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I have indicated that there has been change in British legislation toward multi-channel 
employee involvement, and informing and consulting becomes of special interest for both 
employers and employees. 
      A mixed system with a labour institution and a works council appears to have a pay 
off as regards the participation of workers. There is evidence to suggest that many 
employees are satisfied with advising and counseling, but they are not content with other 
forms of representation (Freeman and Rogers, 1999). There are not any differences 
among organized and unorganized workers, apart from trade unionists finding themselves 
in a better position in terms of having a greater knowledge of wage systems in an 
industry. When there is only a consultative committee employees are content with the 
level of informing and consulting. This is also the case in workplaces with both a works 
council and a labour institution. Employees are not satisfied when neither is available, but 
that is also true when there is a labour institution without a works council. There are two 
explanations why some trade unionists may not be happy with advising and counseling, 
perhaps they have greater ambitions which can not be easily met, or some managers may 
feel restrained to provide with informing and consulting. Nevertheless, it is important 
that, in workplaces where there is both a labour institution and a consultative committee 
employees are pleased with advising and counseling. 
      So, is it possible for informing and consulting to be complementary with organized 
negotiations? Here, the enactment of the EU Directive Establishing a General Framework 
for Informing and Consulting Employees is going to have a great effect. 
      Britain now has a multi-channel network of employee involvement, where collective 
bargaining persists to some extent, advising and counseling through a works council has 
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been delayed, and the role of labour institutions has been diminished. As far as the 
legislation and its implementation are concerned, the United Kingdom has decisively 
followed the path of multiple channels representation and is reasonably expected to 
follow this path even further. British employees aim at a higher level of worker 
participation, but with a strong desire for informing and consulting. The ongoing 
developments provide for a number of challenges and opportunities for both employers 
and employees. As a result of the EU Directive, there is a good chance for the state to 
constitute in the United Kingdom a stable and efficient organizational structure of worker 
representation and participation. For some managers this may be a chance to enfeeble 
collective organization, but for other managers it may be a chance to reach agreements 
that emerge as complementary. To revisit the main argument of this chapter, that is 
whether social partnership and collective organization are compatible, a mixed system of 
continental style employee involvement with works councils and trade unions can assist 
in the formation of such a complementarity.                                 
  
Conclusions 
 
      The language used to explain partnership unionism and worker mobilization is 
distinct and, among academics and professionals, is defined by a diversity of concepts for 
the revitalization of industrial relations (Kelly, 1996). However, it is clear, that elements 
of the two approaches are integrated in institutional policies. The Trade Unions Congress, 
for example, has made a vigorous and determined attempt to revive collective 
organization throughout the country and established an Organizing Academy to train a 
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number of employees in the practices of new forms of representation. At the same time, it 
has provided for union-management cooperation, started a Partnership Institute and 
proposed a variety of rules, which allow for the development of collaboration on the 
shop-floor. This chapter looked into the extent to which social partnership and union 
activism have a separate and independent existence and also addressed the question if 
they can supplement each other to revitalize workplace relations.  
      The emergence of social partnership exerts great influence on the determination of 
union strategies and the ongoing developments in industrial relations. The establishment 
of agreement and conference is dependent upon the achievement of getting support from 
managers and workers. When the Tories were still in power and the European Union was 
not present, trade unions had no other option but to concentrate on the workplace. 
However, the possibility of extended European Union jurisdiction, advocated by the 
Socialists, suggests that we can look forward to constitutional acts, to arrive, like a 
redeemer, and restore to favour the enfeebled trade unions. At this point, the concept of 
social partnership as a different style of employee involvement or a distinct form of 
corporate governance has proved its status with European Works Councils. As a result, 
we can also expect the rhetoric of politicians, economists, chief executives and employee 
delegates to reflect novel ideas and innovative concepts. Nonetheless, if social 
partnership is based on a fragmented structure of organizational operations performed by 
employers and employees, the long-lasting authorization and independence of labour 
institutions is open to question. Despite the fact that the theory of industrial relations and 
labour institutions gives an account of diverse opinions, social partnership may well be 
defined as an alternative to pluralism or unitarism. 
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      The decade of the nineties was very important for the political developments with 
regard to labour institutions. The return of socialist governments in Europe and America 
during the last ten years has culminated in the abandonment of New Right economics. As 
another option, a new industrial relations system, based on the Third Way has entered 
into the picture, which calls in question the predominance of neo-liberalism. As a result, 
the implications for labour institutions are significant, though not very well defined. The 
background of social partnership provides for state intervention in the area of industrial 
relations, with the clear objective to ensure that employee representation is existent for 
the less privileged workers. In Britain, for example, this is evident in the introduction of 
policies like the National Minimum Wage and Statutory Trade Union Recognition. 
Partnership agreements may be fundamental in the formation of an original negotiating 
framework for employers and employees that emphasizes the importance of coordinative 
workplace relations. Of special prominence is the imperative need for both managers and 
workers to transform the nature of their engagement with individual matters of employee 
empowerment and issues like consultation and vocational training (Lucio and Stuart, 
2002). 
      An objective of this chapter was to inquire into the dispersion to Britain of the 
American model of collective organization for the revitalization of unionism. It illustrated 
that the Academy of the Trade Unions Congress has affected the dissemination of union 
organizing and that collective action has been adopted with eagerness by a small number 
of trade unionists (Heery et al. 2000) With reference to all the employee delegates, 
however, union organizing is identified by a variety of characteristics and the more 
progressive parts such as a vigorous attempt to appoint counselors in a wide range of 
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business, has not faired very well. The qualities of the framework which have a larger 
impact are those which stress the significance of effective worker participation as the 
underlying principle for membership density, because these are in agreement with the 
modes of operation in the United Kingdom and the dependence of trade unions on 
methods of exercising influence upon managers. 
      It has been recognized that to some extent employees are proprietors and customers in 
addition to members of staff, and that these multifaceted characteristics brought about a 
distinctive pattern of organizational operations (Heery, 1993). In this way, the language 
of social partnership can develop the general notion of a neo-pluralist employment 
relationship in the workplace to include directors, stakeholders and the workforce. The 
investigation into stakeholding, indicates that a modern style of industrial relations 
systems that recognize more than one ultimate principle, will also have an effect on the 
reconcilement of tasks and responsibilities (Ackers, 2001). The concept of workplace 
relations has been explained, up to the present, in respect to economics, as the need for 
employers and employees to maximize productivity (Ackers, 2002). From a different 
perspective, this is not a procedure, that can be attained or imposed by force. The 
employment relationship may as well contain an ingredient of coercion, nevertheless, it is 
essential that a cooperative liaison is based on reciprocal agreements and joint interests. 
High commitment human resource management champions the idea that a company pact 
is not good enough, but it entails specific external common rules of conduct. In sum, an 
industrial relations structure must be perceived as an economic association also 
concerned with accepted standards of behaviour. 
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      By building up separate ideas into a new theory, I demonstrated that partnership is 
compatible with organization. In practice, the US variant of collective organization seems 
to be indispensable to a German style of stake holding. It is by way of providing an 
opportunity and exerting influence at the same time that trade unions have the ability and 
the authority to benefit from a collaborative employment relationship. This project 
suggests that employee delegates have to stand by union-management cooperation on the 
provision that the environment is favourable. The conclusion reached by this research 
challenges the perception that social partnership is quiescent and culminates in the 
fragmentation of labour institutions. 
      With regard to union tactics, the balance of making provisions for old workers and 
enrolling new employees was not clearly determined. To this point, collection of statistics 
and monitorship of promotions, had not been given careful thought. It was taking too 
much time for labour institutions to deal with the professional administration of business 
concerns and in particular to cope with the breakdown of centralized arrangements. The 
emphasis laid on business ethics implicates that these problems must have been resolved. 
      When a trade union is absent the desire for collective organization among employees 
in unorganized sites originates from their knowledge about the political and 
socioeconomic environment, their understanding of industrial relations and the potential 
for collective organization in the existence of an acknowledged trade union. Accordingly, 
to enhance their effect in unorganized sites trade unions have to identify what workers 
have in mind on those topics, and with conference, attempt to persuade them of the 
advantages of unionization. This analysis suggests a number of institutional policies. 
Trade unions have to concentrate on non-unionized workers, inasmuch as they are more 
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receptive to mobilization. Unorganized employees are more sensitive to union activity 
when they consider the relationship with the employer as one that is not founded upon 
general agreement, and there is also a deficiency of functional communication. Labour 
institutions must decide on the course of action to be taken which is not Human Resource 
Management oriented because this is associated with a decline in the desire for 
unionization. Although they are not likely to harm employee mobilization, works 
councils are more popular than trade unions among unorganized workers. Labour 
institutions have to take into consideration alternative ways in which to perform tasks so 
as to reinforce the urge for union activity. Finally, the desire for unionization is 
dependent upon an augmented membership, to guarantee a favourable employment 
relationship in an unorganized place. 
      In Britain, generally, the most important institutions for industrial relations relate to 
collective bargaining. However, in late years, collective bargaining in Britain has dropped 
off. Accordingly, the data indicates that, in places with a recognized trade union, 
collective bargaining declined from 86 per cent in the eighties to 67 percent in the 
nineties (WERS, 2004). None the less, agreements at company level appear to have been 
on the upgrade, for example via regular meetings for managers and workers, and through 
other channels (Poole et al. 2005). However, the distribution of earnings, after an increase 
in the eighties did not change in the nineties, and employee shareholding was on the 
downgrade until the turn of the century (Millward et al. 2000). This situation drew 
attention to another issue that had to be discussed. To what an extent is the gradual 
evolution of workplace relations resistant to change? An answer to this question is that 
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institutional complementarities have a great effect on the role of managers and the forms 
of collective representation.            
      One more perspective is how American MNCs act together effectively with the 
employment relationship in Europe and how trade unionists react to this, in other words, 
how the country-of-origin effect is mediated by the host country conditions. I have 
explained why US multinationals have not acted in accordance with the practices of 
British labour institutions, though this is alleviated by the necessity to adapt to the 
national system of workplace relations. There are not many studies, however, which 
examine in detail the structure of a multinational corporation (Royle, 2000). There is 
practically no insight on how a single company level policy is implemented and becomes 
operational in integrated systems like Germany or France in comparison with flexible 
structures like Britain. A proposition for further research, is how the non-union culture of 
many American MNCs is accommodated in a host country climate that provides for 
union activity? A response to this query is that in more coordinated networks US 
multinationals with a non-union culture are reasonably expected to seek alternatives to 
unionism such as mutual gains enterprises. 
      From another perspective, workplace relations systems are path dependent and may 
be difficult to replicate. The appearance of workers councils during the first quarter of the 
20
th
 century was the most advanced expression of the old proletarian movement, but it 
was unnoticed or forgotten, except in travestied forms, because it was repressed and 
destroyed along with all the rest of the movement. Now, from the vantage point of the 
new stage of proletarian critique, the councils can be seen in their true light as the only 
undefeated aspect of a defeated movement (Debors, 2006). The historical consciousness 
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that recognizes that the councils are the only terrain in which it can thrive can now see 
that they are no longer at the periphery of a movement that is subsiding, but at the centre 
of a movement that is rising.  The point is that there are lessons to be learned for British 
trade unions from the continental states. If British labour institutions follow the American 
way they will become isolated in the shrinking field of collective bargaining. On the 
other hand, it is quite possible that they can profit from works councils type 
arrangements, as in Germany. However, the French example illustrates there is not one 
best way to succeed, unless they are able to benefit from these arrangements. With regard 
to Germany and France the argument is that European style representation and 
consultation can be transferred to Britain. I have demonstrated that there have been 
reforms in British law towards multiple channels worker participation, and advising and 
counseling has become important for both managers and workers. Furthermore, the 
implementation of the EU Directive Establishing a General Framework for Informing and 
Consulting Employees is expected to have a great impact. To conclude, this reinforces 
the central argument of the second chapter that social partnership and collective 
organization can be complementary because a multi-channel network of worker 
representation and participation with works councils and labour institutions can support 
such an organizational compatibility.  
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